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The purpose of this thesis is to provide the reader with an
overview of the U.S. Navy's Copernicus CI Architecture. The
acronym "C I" emphasizes the intimate relationship between
command, control, computers, communications, and intelligence, as
well as their significance to the modern day warrior. Never in
the history of the U.S. Navy has the importance of an extremely
4flexible C I architecture been made more apparent than in the
last decade.
Included are discussions of the Copernicus concept, its
command and control doctrine, its architectural goals and
components, and Copernicus-related programs. Also included is a
discussion on joint service efforts and the initiatives being
conducted by the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Air Force, and the
U.S. Army. Finally, a discussion of the Copernicus Phase I
Requirements Definition Document's compliance with the
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John Pike, defense analyst at the Federation of American
Scientists, said "The Navy has a communications system geared
to voice and telex traffic in an era of wars based on the
exchange of wideband data. The big lesson learned from Desert
Storm was the absolute inadequacy of Navy communications." He
goes on to further state, "the Navy badly needs to develop a
system such as Copernicus. It might seem high, but $14.5
billion is about the cost of one carrier battle group, and
after the second day of Operation Desert Storm, the Navy could
do little with its aircraft because of problems in delivering
air tasking orders." [Ref. l:p. 49]
With the establishment of Space and Electronic Warfare
(SEW) as a designated warfare area within the Navy by the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in 1989, command and control
2 .(C ) functions have been doctrinally designated to the SEW
mission. Naval command and control is the warfare function
through which a maritime commander delegates warfighting
responsibilities to subordinate commanders and their units
under his command. Command and control is exercised through
a supporting technological, doctrinal, and organizational
subsystem known today as command, control, communications
4 4
computers, and intelligence (CI). CI should be viewed as
2the means to the end of C . [Ref. 2: p. 1-1]
Naval C I consists of three components:
• Command and Control, which in the Navy is embodied in
the Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) Composite Warfare
Commander (CWC) doctrine, in the submarine force
deployment and water management doctrines and in the
amphibious doctrine—all evolutionary outgrowths of
World War II. In the Joint Task Forces (JTF) of the
future, command and control will be embedded in that
commander's doctrine, which, like all doctrine, will
continue to evolve as the unified commanders and the
Services plan, practice, and participate in joint
operations;
• Communications and Computers, the modern technological
"glue" that ties the commander to his forces and to the
shore-based intelligence and command centers, which
enables information management; and
4
• Intelligence, which, in the context of C I, is at once
both a process of discerning enemy intentions and
capabilities and a technological, organizational, and a
sensor system that provides much of the information from
which to initiate that process. [Ref. 2:p. 1-1]
4
C I should be considered as a "triangular" acronym
(Figure 1-1) , with command and control at the apex and
information management (communications and computers) and
intelligence at the supporting angles. It is critical to
4develop a C I support system that is far more flexible than
what is currently available today to enable doctrinal
flexibility in command and control. While flexibility will
be the cornerstone of post-Cold War operations, today's CI
system is characterized by some as inflexible. Serious
limitations in both information management and intelligence
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Figure 1-1. Naval CI. [Ref. 2:p 1-8]
4
on command and control. Today's CI system has become
technologically, doctrinally, and organizationally obsolete,
[Ref. 2:p. 1-2]
A. THE CURRENT COMMAND AND CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND
COMPUTERS, AND INTELLIGENCE (C*I) ARCHITECTURE
During the Renaissance, the Polish churchman and
astronomer Nicholas Copernicus published a thesis in 1543,
entitled De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium (The Revolution
of Heavenly Orbs) , which introduced a radically new idea
that changed the world. In it he declared that the
geocentric system wherein the earth was in the center was
incorrect. He stated that nature must be simple and not as
complex as pre-Copernican mathematics and astronomy made it
to be.
Not unlike Copernicus' dilemma, current naval CI
. .
..... 4
architecture finds itself in a similar situation. Naval C I
has grown so complex and cumbersome that it has become
outdated and invalid within the current post-Cold War
environment. Note
the proliferation of sensors, their different formats,
protocols, organizational sponsors, complex programmatic
agendas, and conflicting operational goals have made the
mechanics of our C I "astronomy" far too complex. Each
shore-based sensor, each organization that feeds and
cares for it, has become its own center of the universe.
[Ref. 3:p. 88]
Inevitably, by the early 1980s, the products from these
sensors began to flow seaward to the Officer in Tactical
Command (OTC) in the form of variously formatted record
traffic, each of which required dedicated communications
nets to send it to sea. Moreover, the OTC received these
messages whether he needed them or not.
B. SHORTFALLS IN THE CURRENT C*I ARCHITECTURE
According to the Copernicus Phase I document, there are
eight systemic shortfalls in today's architecture. These
eight consist of the following:
First, we are trying to take the threat to our existing
command and control doctrine instead of taking a flexible
approach to command and control doctrine based upon the
threat. [Ref. 2:p. 2-1] For the last 45 years, the Services
have developed command and control doctrines against the
Soviet
—
global and theater—threat. The culmination of
these doctrines is the Navy's Composite Warfare Commander
(CWC) concept and the Army's and Air Force's AirLand Battle
doctrine. The world, however, has changed. Any single-
service or global-war oriented doctrines will inevitably
give way to or be modified by both the sheer diversity of
the Contingency and Limited Objective Warfare (CALOW)
threats and by the similar diversity in task force
composition
—
joint and allied, and different allies today
and tomorrow. [Ref. 2:p. 2-8]
Second, taken in the aggregate, the Navy has not yet
found a viable way to separate operational traffic from
administrative traffic. During wartime there is no real
technological means to gain capacity to support an increased
operational tempo. [Ref. 2:p. 2-1]
In today's architecture, some 33,000 ashore commands can
send messages to the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) at
sea at the whim and timing of the sender. The receiver, the
OTC, is thus inundated and robbed of potentially critical
communications capacity. [Ref. 2:p. 2-1]
Third, information is conveyed in the wrong format
—
narrative messages—and in the wrong form
—
paper. There is
a need to consider potentially useful media, such as
sophisticated graphics displays, video, facsimile, etc.
,
K
while reducing dependence on record message traffic. The
reliance on narrative traffic to communicate has serious
implications:
• It is necessary for OTCs to read a narrative in order to
gain information.
• The goal should be simultaneous distribution of
consolidated information leading to a consistent
tactical picture ashore and afloat. A much discussed
operational issue arises about whether to consolidate
information ashore or afloat because it has not been
possible in the past for the OTC to read all traffic.
• Narrative is not only inefficient from an information
standpoint but also from a communications perspective
due to the inherent technical inefficiency of narrative
transmission.
• Finally, the narrative is the technological and human
bridge between organic sensors and non-organic sensors.
Using narrative, therefore, introduces a redundancy and
a resulting unnecessary ambiguity to the tactical
picture. [Ref. 2:p. 2-1]
Fourth, the current system, with its emphasis on
narrative traffic and its reflection of its diverse sensors
and analytic nodes ashore, is inefficient. This causes the
current architecture to be incompatible with the developing
national strategy for dealing with contingency and limited-
objective warfare (CALOW) and regional conflicts. [Ref. 2:p.
2-1]
Fifth, there exists no real capability to exploit multi-
frequency communications. There is currently no way to
utilize HF, UHF, SHF, and EHF interchangeably. Along with
this is the diversity of communications bearer services
which is inadequate in many cases. Virtual networking with
broad choices of services both in format and in media, must
be developed. [Ref. 2:p. 2-2]
Sixth, several factors—the narrative format, the lack
of common display, relative versus navigation references,
staff compromises—have resulted in a significant loss of
operational perspective with respect to sensor traffic.
There are serious organizational and doctrinal problems that
need to be corrected. For example, despite currently
developing national strategy for CALOW operations, there is
a lack of command centers properly equipped to support CALOW
operations. Also the intelligence community is just now
beginning to tailor the amount and type of data that is
passed to the fleet in order to support those operations.
Architecturally and operationally, the goal must be: one
emission sensed leads to one location report over one
communications path to sea at one time. [Ref. 2:p. 2-2]
4 .CI communications loading should reflect the enemy's
4
actions, our actions, and the C I system reporting these
parameters. While the first cannot be controlled, and it is
not desirable to limit the second, efficiencies can be
brought to the third. C I should decrease, not increase,
the fog of war. [Ref. 2:p.2-ll]
Seventh, the close of the Cold War era presented a new
necessity: that of developing and disseminating information
on a far broader category of potential threats. A new
intelligence infrastructure must be constructed that can
allow a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst assigned
to a specific problem to be in contact with colleagues
within the DIA, the State Department, the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) , and in industry who are also
working on the same problem but from a different angle.
Finally, information must be moved to sea in a structured,
efficient, tactical context on short notice. [Ref. 2:p. 2-2]
The new intelligence infrastructure must come about from
the previous Soviet and single Service-oriented
infrastructure to a CALOW-capable infrastructure—one which
can respond to the component commander tactically and to the
National Command Authorities strategically within the same
CALOW battle space. [Ref. 2:p. 2-12]
Eighth, and finally, following from this information
problem, the means must be developed to display and
disseminate intelligence information more efficiently
(Figure 1-2). [Ref. 2:p. 2-2]
The above eight shortfalls of today's architecture mean
that data file transfer to sea is done by flying disks onto
carrier decks by aircraft. Tomorrow, the data file and the
image must replace the message as the principal operational
format. Moreover, the data file and image must be displayed
and utilized in context on a common workstation so that an
operational synergism between sensor tracks, images, and






































Figure 1-2. Shortfalls in the Current Architecture. [Ref
2:p 2-12]
II. THE COPERNICUS ARCHITECTURE CONCEPT
A. CONCEPT DESCRIPTION
In the post-Cold war environment the Navy and Marine
Corps are restructuring the command, control,
4
communications, computers and intelligence (C I)
infrastructure around a series of eight global information
exchange systems ashore and tactical information exchange
systems afloat. This new system has been designated
Copernicus as it directs the focus of tactical systems to
the operator's needs instead of equipment capabilities, as
was previously done.
The Copernicus Architecture, in simplest terms, is
designed to be a telecommunications system based on a series
of the following: first, virtual global networks called
Global Information Exchange Systems (GLOBIXS) ; second,
metropolitan area networks called CINC Command Centers
(CCC) ; and third, tactical virtual nets called Tactical Data
Information Exchange Systems (TADIXS) . All these will be
interconnected in support of the Tactical Command Center
(TCC) (Figure 2-1)
.
As such, the Copernicus Architecture should therefore be
considered as both a new C I architecture to replace the






















Figure 2-1. Copernicus Architectural Model
52]
[Ref . 4:p A -
11
programmatic basis to construct it over the next decade
[Ref. 2:p. 3-1].
In this architecture, data forwarded from the tactical
commander to shore and from ashore to the tactical commander
(and all subscribers in between) is differentiated by two
factors, namely, precedence and format. Precedence refers
to three cases of data:
• Case 1 data is defined as immediate in precedence and is
typically a sensor location report in binary format or
voice report originating from sensor nodes ashore and
afloat. Tactical commanders may decide to receive or
not receive Case 1 data. If the tactical commander
decides not to receive a sensor report, it nevertheless
would be monitored by the appropriate GLOBIXS anchor
(discussed later) . Technologically, this is achieved by
converting the sensor location reports into binary
packets and addressing the packets to those commanders
who desire them.
• Case 2 data may also originate from sensor nodes but
more typically from analytic nodes ashore and from other
tactical units and is usually an OPNOTE, a voice report,
or perhaps even data files or imagery. Like Case 1
data, Tactical commanders may also decide to receive or
not receive Case 2 data.
• Case 3 data is "term" data: data that is not time-
sensitive, relative to Cases 1 and 2. [Ref. 2:p. 3-1]
(Figure 2-2)
In forwarding Case 1, 2, or 3 data, one of the following
eight operational formats may be utilized:
• voice;
• OPNOTE, a short, interactive analyst-to-analyst exchange
similar to E-mail;
• narrative message, the existing character-oriented
format;
• Copernicus Common Format (COPCOM) , a sensor location
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Figure 2-2. Copernicus Common Services by Precedence and
Format. [Ref. 2:p 3-12]
• facsimile;
• data files;
• imagery ; and
• video.
However, what is truly significant in this new
architecture is the renewed focus on the operator. This new
architecture focuses on the operator at four levels:
• The Watchstander, through the employment of common,
high-technology workstations (known as Fleet All-Source
Tactical Terminals or FASTTs) , identical from station to
station except for mission-specific software delineating
the communities of interest. With this, the Anti-
13
submarine Warfare (ASW) analyst at the GLOBIXS, the ASW
foundation at the CCC, the ASW TADIXS subscribers, and
the ASW commander in the TCC all share a common human-
machine interface (HMI) hosted on identical terminals.
• The Navy Tactical Commander, through the employment of
the virtual TADIXS, the number and nature of which are
changeable to suit his command and control doctrinal
decisions (discussed below) , and through the
configurable TCC.
• The JTF Commander, who in the post-Cold War command
structure likely will emerge as the on-scene tactical
commander, through the development of an architectural
capability to size, shape, and scope many diverse shore
and tactical components into the GLOBIXS-TADIXS
Copernicus model ; and
• The Shore Commander, from the Fleet Commanders in Chief
(FLTCINCs) to the Unified Commanders to the National
Command Authorities (NCA) through the development of
broad, high-technology command connectivity (e.g.,
video, voice, narrative) and through the establishment
of a rapidly configurable GLOBIXS that can tie the
commander to all echelons, across all Services, to all
allies, and across the spectrum of warfare. [Ref. 2:p.
3-6, 3-7]
B. COPERNICUS COMMAND AND CONTROL DOCTRINE
Copernicus provides the tactical commander six doctrinal
choices that allow him to construct his command and control
to support the mission and his decision to delegate forces
to carry out that mission [Ref. 2:p. 3-12].
1. During the planning stage of an operation, the
tactical commander must make a determination as to what
forces to use and to whom to delegate the forces. To
facilitate and parallel that decision, the commander will
configure the TCC (and, by extension, the TCCs of units
under his control) to reflect his plan. Thus, the first
14
decision under Copernicus is to determine who and what
comprises the TCC for the mission. [Ref. 2: p. 3-13]
2. The tactical commander must determine what
information to delegate to the CCC ashore and what to retain
for himself. For instance, one commander may want all
information in one category and only some in another. This
decision not only may be scenario-driven but also may be
personality-driven—does he have more confidence in the
shore imagery anchor than the intelligence officer afloat?
[Ref. 2:p. 3-13]
3. The tactical commander must determine who may talk to
him from the GLOBIXS infrastructure and in what situations.
Bear in mind, however, that this decision is a dynamic one.
Thus, as discussed earlier, instead of 33,000 commands
sending messages to the tactical commander whether he needed
them or not, it is now possible to consolidate data through
the GLOBIXS gateway managed by the CCC responding to the
tactical commander's delegation. [Ref. 2:p. 3-13]
4
.
The tactical commander must determine who gets what
kind of information. This is an information management issue
the resolution of which is made possible technologically by
selecting communication services and routing the information
to the selected units and appropriate TCC positions. [Ref.
2:p. 3-14]
5. The tactical commander must determine what the
network mix will be, that is, having decided who can talk to
15
him and when, he must now determine the method by which they
will communicate with him. This refers to the instantaneous
construction of the virtual information networks, primarily
the TADIXS. [Ref. 2: p. 3-14]
6. Finally, the tactical commander must select the
communications resources (communications circuits and bearer
services) over which the TADIXS virtual information networks
will be transmitted and received. That selection is made in
accordance with the Communications Support System (CSS)
Communications Resource Manager. [Ref. 2: p. 3-15] CSS uses
a communications architecture that utilizes multi-media
(i.e., UHF SATCOM, UHF LOS, HF) and media-sharing to provide
improved communications flexibility, survivability,
connectivity, and efficiency. The CSS has as its major
components users, communication resources (i.e., radios,
transceivers, frequencies, channels, time slots, etc.), and
a software-based communications manager that assigns the
resources to users in accordance with direction from the
tactical commander in the form of a connection plan. [Ref.
2: p. 6-3] CSS is further explained in Appendix B.
C. GOALS OF THE COPERNICUS ARCHITECTURE.
Through its four components (these being GLOBIXS, CCC,
TADIXS, TCC) , Copernicus will be constructed as an
interactive framework that ties together the command and
control process of the Navy tactical commander afloat, the
16
Joint Task Force (JTF) commander, the numbered fleet
commanders and others with the CINCs ashore. To accomplish
this, Copernicus has ten architectural goals:
[Ref. 2:p. 3-3]
1. Technological, organizational, and doctrinal
flexibility to accommodate open ocean operations, prolonged
regional conflicts, and crisis action;
2
.
An investment strategy with force-planning criteria
to scale down in post-Cold War, jettison outdated programs,
and ensure new programs are part of an overall blueprint;
3. Centralized architectural development and oversight
with standardized technological components and consolidated,
operational, tactical networks;
4. Decentralized development of mission-specific,
multimedia, global networks within the blueprint to maximize
experience and innovation down-echelon;
5. Analogous command centers ashore and afloat that
share a consistent tactical picture and connect Navy to the
Joint and Allied picture;
6. Marriage of national assets to tactical applications;
the accommodation of Space and Electronic Warfare (SEW) , a
newly designated warfare area within the Navy;
7. A new logistics strategy—Planned Incremental
Modernization (PIM) —to keep the leading edge of technology
in the fleet while reducing the Navy Integrated Logistics
Support (ILS) and maintenance tail;
17
8. An end to domination of the Navy communications by
the message format; an approach to true office automation;
9. Both functional and technological consolidation of
military SATCOM bandwidth and an affordable high-data rate
alternative to it; and
10. Better security through Multilevel Security (MLS) in
the intelligence fusion process, elimination of hardcopy
cryptographic key (i.e., Over-the-Air Rekeying [OTAR] and
Over-the-Air Transfer [OTAT]), and establishment of a Navy-
wide secure Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
(RDT&E) network.
D. COPERNICUS ARCHITECTURE COMPONENTS
... 4The Copernicus Architecture is both a new C I
architecture to replace the current system and an investment
strategy that provides a programmatic basis to construct it
over the next decade. The focus here will be on the
architecture itself and the four support components. (Figure
2-3)
1. The Global Information Exchange Systems (GLOBIXS)
The Global Information Exchange System (GLOBIXS) is
a mixture of shore stations with their sensor nodes,
laboratories, research centers, etc., linked by virtual
networks to support the forces afloat. Basically, all
informational gathering facilities that can assist the












Figure 2-3. Pillars of Copernicus. [Ref. 2:p 8-1]
encompassed in the network which is designed to operate on
common-user communication systems like the Defense
Communications System (DCS) or FTS2000. A GLOBIXS will be
centered around the CINC Command Complex (CCC) . The CCC
will serve as the gateway for communications and information
that need to flow to the Tactical Command Center (TCCs)
.
These components will be discussed later. GLOBIXS reflect
the belief that the post-Cold War operating environment will
be far more data-intensive and require far more
technological agility in obtaining, handling, and
transmitting data than during the Cold War. [Ref. 2: p. 4-2]
As a common-user communication system, the Defense
Communications Systems (DCS) , the DOD information system,
will enable subscribers to pass large volumes of information
hundreds of times faster than the existing teletype circuits
resident today in most Navy communications centers afloat.
19
Moreover, the DCS is but one implementation of an
increasingly nationwide data infrastructure for the next
century that will be as critical to American industry and
government in the Information Age as the physical
infrastructure of roads, telephones, and power plants was in
the last. Fiber optic cable, with the promise of massive
information transfer, is circling the globe [Ref. 5:p. 24].
The development of a more complex communications
system and the increased power of computers, both PCs and
workstations, have allowed for the movement towards open
system architectures. This makes possible the aggregation
of many shore-based commands—both Navy and non-Navy—into
powerful networks of "communities of common interests."
These virtual, shore-based nets, called GLOBIXS, use DCS
addresses and common software. Thus, it becomes possible to
construct a global Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) or a High
Command net with little investment in communications
infrastructure using standardized hardware, and to make the
conceptual leap from data to information with the use of
software. [Ref. 2:p. 4-5 to 4-6]
Thus, the GLOBIXS' ashore nets will be a series of
virtual sensor and analytic DCS nets that will provide
information management and information concentration by
acting as the shore gateway for specific reports to sea.
These nets will be high-speed, highly concentrated with
limited-access, and connected to each other [Ref. 5:p. 25].
20
As previously mentioned, in today's architecture,
some 33,000 commands ashore can send a message to sea at any
given time. This is done at the discretion of the sender,
not the receiver, who may become inundated and thus robbed
of critical communications capacity at a crucial point in
time. The basis of Copernicus is that through the CCC, the
GLOBIXS system will manage and intersect to form a limited-
access information system that will be controlled by the
receiver. (Figure 2-4)
Consequently, one Composite Warfare Commander (CWC)
at a particular time may desire to be connected to one set
of GLOBIXS nodes, while another CWC may want to talk to a
different set. Of course, all commanders will require a
certain core of information from shore-based analytic nodes
and sensor sites. However, commanders who want large
volumes of one type of data but not another, or who want
greater or lesser diversification of data among the CWC
subordinates, can tailor their information receipts from the
GLOBIXS matrices accordingly.
The number of GLOBIXS will change to reflect the
organizational structure of the shore and operating forces
as well as the operational tempo. It is intended that the
Copernicus architecture will support the command structure
over the next five decades, not merely the next five years.
Thus, the construction of a GLOBIXS is accomplished by






























Figure 2-4. From GLOBIX to TADIXS. [Ref. 4:p A-36]
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DCS backbone at a proposed GLOBIXS node with tailored
applications.
The eight standing GLOBIXS are joint both in
character and by definition because they reflect the
aggregation of communities of interest DOD-wide. Five are
operationally oriented and contain the major sensor and
analytic nodes, both Navy and national. They are:
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) GLOBIXS;
Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) GLOBIXS;
Space and Electronic Warfare (SEW) GLOBIXS;
Imagery GLOBIXS; and
Data base Management GLOBIXS.
A sixth is multi-media net (e.g., video conferencing, voice,
facsimile, narrative), connecting major commands (i.e.,




The seventh and eighth standing GLOBIXS primarily are
supportive in nature. They include:
• Research and Development Information Exchange System
(RDIXS) , ties together Navy laboratories, weapons
testing facilities, and other developmental entities for
security and for information exchange; and
• Naval Information Exchange System (NAVIXS) , as
previously mentioned, is the Navy implementation of the
DMS. Until true multi-level security is achieved, it
will operate separately at the GENSER and SCI levels.
[Ref. 2:p. 4-7]
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A GLOBIXS can best be characterized graphically in a
























Figure 2-5. GLOBIXS Layered Concept. [Ref. 2:p 4-10]
The technological presentation for the GLOBIXS is
achieved from four types of Copernicus building blocks:
• Network services, which for GLOBIXS are imposed over
both the DOD DCS and over commercial bearer services;
• Hardware, which will be finite in number. Most hardware
building blocks for GLOBIXS exist today; however,
selecting a standard building block from the many
duplicative stove-pipe programs will be necessary.
• Operating systems, which will be commercial-off-the-
shelf (COTS) in origin; and
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• Software, which will largely be COTS; however, all
software that is Government-unique will be written in
Ada. [Ref. 2:p. 4-10]
Using these four components, it is possible to
construct a model of a less conceptual GLOBIXS and add it to
the information product matrix (i.e., cases and formats of
data) shown is Figure 2-6. Of the eight GLOBIXS described,
all are constructed identically; the difference among them
will be subscribership and product. r
Thus, from the standpoint of the information network
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Figure 2-6. Communications Services: Precedence and
Format. [Ref. 2:p 4-11]
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network imposed over DCS (or commercial) bearer services
that ties together the high command infrastructure ashore
(and via the TADIXS, afloat) using immediate and near-
immediate priority services: voice, OPNOTE, data files,
imagery, and video conferencing. [Ref. 2:p. 4-12]
Regarding the hardware and software needs of the
Command GLOBIXS, it is anticipated that they each will have,
at a minimum, a Secure Telephone Unit (STU III) terminal and
a FASTT, configured for video conferencing. Additionally,
some type of server will likely be used in conjunction with
the local area network (LAN) where the Command GLOBIXS is
located. Software needs will be based on open systems
standard and be modular in nature.
The sensor GLOBIXS will be composed of five types of




• Regional analytic nodes;
• Non-Navy nodes, including allied, that may fall into
either category;
• Theater or national analytic nodes; and
• The "anchor" desk connected to the CCC MAN. [Ref. 2:p.
4-13]
Except for the direct targeting TADIXS, the sensor
GLOBIXS provide locational and analytic data to the tactical
commander and are the sole gateway for that information.
Sensor traffic will not be duplicated on NAVIXS and the
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SIGINT GLOBIXS, although the CCC does have the technology to
move any traffic over any GLOBIXS as necessity dictates.
The functions of the SIGINT, ASW, Imagery, and SEW GLOBIXS
will be:
• Within the warfare mission area, to provide the Navy
shore-based analytic conduit from the CCC to the Navy
and national sensors;
• Collection management through the CCC to maximize the
national sensors for tactical use;
• From the sensor and other data inputs, to provide
technical analytic experience and expertise within the
mission area that is not available afloat;
• To develop and maintain historical and regional data
bases and standardized modeling, analytic, and decision
software tools;
• To provide an ashore intersection with the other
Services, DOD agencies, and allies within the mission
area ; and
• To provide the CCC with a common formatted graphics and
OPNOTE product via a standard analyst FASTT station with
tailored software for each GLOBIXS. [Ref. 2:p. 4-15]
The operations of the sensor GLOBIXS are:
• To collect input sensor or other data from the source,
provided that the source does not already disseminate
that data through the direct targeting TADIXS;
• To analyze it for use within the mission area the
GLOBIXS is designed to support; and
• To disseminate the data efficiently in a standard format
to the CCC for dissemination to the fleet. [Ref. 2:p. 4-
15]
The eight GLOBIXS have been structured as to
purpose, engineering responsibilities, claimancy and
operational authority. Of these eight, the two that are
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considered the most detailed, and would allow for the most
efficient and speedy investment, are SIGINT and ASW. Table
2-1, shows the proposed GLOBIXS and their responsibilities.
[Ref. 2:p. 4-17]
2. The CINC Command Complex (CCC)
CINC Command Complex (CCC) will come under the
FLTCINCs for organizational and doctrinal structure, and
will include a number of existing organizations brought
together technologically by common workstations and a common
LAN. It is currently planned to construct three complexes,
one each in Oahu, Hawaii; Norfolk, Virginia; and Naples,
Italy. [Ref. 2:p. 5-2] The CCC would be a vertical
combination of the CINC command structures ashore, as
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opposed to the GLOBIXS, which is a horizontal composite of
"communities of common interest". [Ref. 5: p. 27]
There are two possible ways of development for the
CCC: (1) the architecture is limited to Navy operations, and
(2) the architecture is adopted for joint use. In regards
to the latter, the CINC Command Complex would approach the
design illustrated in Figure 2-7. In the Navy-only command
complex, the design would be fundamentally the same as the
joint complex save the type and format of connectivity with
the unified commanders and the component commanders. [Ref.
5:p. 27]
The transition from component CINC to unified CINC,
coupled with the potential changes in the number of unified
commanders, indicates a lengthy adjustment period for
command centers ashore. In the event that the Copernicus
Architecture is adopted for joint use, creating the unified
CCC is simply a question of doctrine and connectivity. In
practice, the architecture, with its already-joint GLOBIXS
structure and its DOD-approved building blocks, may be seen
as a de facto solution to unified commanders, and the
development of the unified CCC will be an interactive
process from the Navy structure. [Ref. 2:p. 5-4]



























Figure 2-7. Conceptual CCC with GLOBIXS Intersection
[Ref. 2:p 3-4]
a. Fleet Command Center (FCC) :
Supports the FLTCINCs in the exercise of their
responsibilities as naval component commanders. The FCC
would support the FLTCINCs to:
• Implement theater USCINCs 1 directives and policies;
• Allocate combat ready, logistically sustainable,
tactical naval, naval air, and USMC forces to joint
commanders as directed by unified commanders;
• Prepare, evaluate, promulgate and supervise plans,
orders, and tactical decisions;
• Allocate/reallocate assigned resources;
• Schedule employment of forces;
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• Assess and predict tactical situations and fleet
readiness;
• Support miscellaneous command support activities such
as: transit planning; search and rescue operations; and
civilian catastrophe relief; and
• Support the reconstruction and evaluation of completed
actions/exercises
.
The FCC would support the unified commanders to:
• Assign the mission to subordinate forces;
• Allocate resources (e.g., ships, aircraft, submarines,
weapons, fuel, communications)
;
• Monitor execution of the mission;
• Keep higher echelon authorities advised of mission
status (along with status of all FLTCINC missions and
forces) ; and
• Modify mission objectives and constraints as necessary
to meet changing national and theater directives.
Mission direction may be provided as a file
transfer or a directive message stating policy. Information
transfers will be Case 2 or 3 data, depending on mission
urgency. FCCs must manage resources at the theater level
through use of Case 2 and 3 file transfer. [Ref. 2:p. 5-8]
One resource to be managed will be
communications. As noted in connection with related
programs, the CSS software and human-machine interface (HMI)
will be used to manage communications. In addition to
managing U.S. Navy resources, the FCC would coordinate with
other component commanders and with supporting CINCs. [Ref.
2:p. 5-8]
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To monitor mission execution, the FCC could
receive Case 1, 2, and 3 track data (in Copernicus Common
format) from subordinate forces and prepare summary reports
(as Case 2 and 3 file transfers) for higher echelons. Case
2 OPNOTES will support analyst-to-analyst exchanges at all
levels over both GLOBIXS and TADIXS. The FCC is expected to
be the "anchor" for the Command GLOBIXS. [Ref. 2:p. 5-8]
Mission modification may be in the form of Case 2
or 3 file transfers (e.g., modifying a "no-attack" zone in
which target surface ships may not be engaged, for example)
or as messages over Navy Information Exchange System
(NAVIXS) , if necessary, stating new constraints (e.g.,
revised rules of engagement). [Ref. 2:p. 5-8]
b. Operations Watch Center
The Operations Watch Center would be selected by
choosing specific desks which would interactively connect
with watchstanders from intelligence centers, the theater
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Center, the Space and
Electronic Warfare (SEW) Center, and the Research Center, as
well as other watchstanders the CINC might desire to suit a
particular mission. It is the gateway for the Composite
Warfare Commander (CWC) into the shore GLOBIXS structure.
The Operations Watch Center is the heart of the architecture
ashore and will be connected, via the CCC MAN, to the
organizations that make up the CINC Complex. [Ref. 2:p. 5-4]
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c. Space and Electronic Warfare (SEW) Center
Responsible for strategic and theater-level SEW,
including operational deception (OPDEC) and operational
security (OPSEC) . [Ref. 2:p. 5-5]
d. Research Center
Accommodate the file servers and common data
bases that the CCC will access through the data base GLOBIXS
for data-retrieval capabilities via electronic mail.
e. Joint Intelligence Center (JIC)
Has the following elements:
• The Fleet Intelligence Center (FIC) would provide an
interface with the imagery GLOBIXS and the imagery
TADIXS
;
• The Fleet Ocean Surveillance Intelligence Center (FOSIC)
would provide operational intelligence (OPINTEL) for
both maritime and overland operations; and
• The Cryptologic Support Group (CSG) would provide the
interface between SIGINT GLOBIXS subscribers ashore and
the corresponding TADIXS afloat. [Ref. 2:p. 5-5]
f. Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) Center
Shore ASW Command Centers (SACCs) would exercise
command and control over assigned ASW forces. Shore ASW
Command Centers are located in Makalapa, Hawaii; Norfolk,
Virginia; Kami Seya, Japan; and Naples, Italy. These
facilities would exercise control primarily over maritime
patrol aircraft (MPA) and Integrated Undersea Surveillance
System (IUSS) units; however, surface ships and other units
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may also be assigned via the appropriate task group
commander. [Ref. 2:p. 5-10]
3. The Tactical Data Information Exchange Systems
(TADIXS)
Not unlike the GLOBIXS and the CCC, the Tactical
Data Information Exchange Systems (TADIXS) are virtual nets,
established at the request and in the mix desired by the
tactical commander. There is a series of 14 TADIXS that
serve the purpose of exchanging non-organic sensor data from
the GLOBIXS with organic sensor data afloat [Ref. 3:p. 89]
(Table 2-2) . TADIXS will be connected for the length of
time necessary to transport the data to the subscribers and
then broken.
Table 2-2. TADIXS AND PURPOSE. [Ref. 5:p 91]
TADIXS Purpose
TADIXS A/OTCIXS OTC Battle Mgmt
TADIXS B/TRAP ELINT
TADIXS C SEW Mgmt
TADIXS D ASW Mgmt
TADIXS E AAW (JHDS)
TADIXS F Taclntel
TADIXS G Cruise Missile Targeting
TADIXS H High Command
TADIXS I INTELCAST
TADIXS J NAVIXS
TADIXS K Common High-Band Data Link
TADIXS L INTELNET
TADIXS M Combined BCST
TADIXS N Single Integrated Satellite BCST
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The TADIXS will ensure the new centers of the
universe—the CCC and the Tactical Command Center (TCC)
—
share a common tactical picture. It should always be
remembered that TADIXS are operational constructs, not
communications networks. The information contained in a
single TADIXS may be provided via several communications
channels or vice versa. TADIXS, therefore, spring from an
operational decision about where to send data onto the TCC
and CCC networks and how to display them. Simply put,
Copernican TADIXS, unlike the current and planned TADIXS A
and TADIXS B, manifest themselves at their points of origin
and destination, that is, they exist at the CCC and the TCC
but not enroute to either. [Ref. 2:p. 6-1, 6-2] It is
important to understand that, because of their virtual ity,
TADIXS are essentially doctrinal delineations of information
to and from the GLOBIXS ashore and from the afloat platforms
and sensors at sea [Ref. 2:p. 6-1] (Figure 2-8).
There are three very significant advantages to using
TADIXS. They are:
• The virtual elimination of the Navy message as an
operational format, moving instead toward the eight
formats discussed in Chapter II, Section A.
• The provision of a major improvement in information
management: not only will the information veneer—the
mission software that present data as operational
information—be both more efficient and more powerful
than text but will also result in greater efficiency in
communications capacity.
• Improvement in Communication Support Service (CSS)




Figure 2-8. What is a TADIXS? [Ref. 2:p 3-15]
techniques. In the past such techniques focused on the
waveform of the SATCOM terminal, such as MILSTAR 's very
survivable EHF waveform. The trade-off, however, is in
throughput which, for MILSTAR, is far less than the
potential inherent in the physics of the EHF band.
While it is clear that tactical commanders will continue
to require a core of anti-jam communications (such as
that provided by MILSTAR EHF), less critical, i.e.,
"general purpose," communications can be provided with
jam-resistance if TADIXS agility is provided. [Ref. 2:p.
6-4]
Like GLOBIXS, TADIXS should be considered a minimal set,
with consolidation and expansion of their numbers and types
a reflection of command structure and doctrine. Thus, the
concept of information flow from the GLOBIXS to TADIXS and
back has to be taken on three conceptual planes:
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First, the different technological "envelopes" in
which data are packaged and formatted (for example,
Government Open System Interconnecting Profile [GOSIP] or
Communication Support System [CSS] custom protocols for
tactical applications)
;
Second, the operational data layering, that is, the
doctrinal decision to place the data on a particular TADIXS
and route the data to a particular commander's workstation;
and
Third, the transformation of data from the TADIXS to
information, which is a function of the software interface
on the Copernican tactical computers—the Fleet All-Source
Tactical Terminals (FASTTs) and other hardware. [Ref. 2: p.
6-1]
There are four broad categories of TADIXS or, like
the GLOBIXS, "communities of interest" [Ref. 2:p. 6-5 to 6-
7]:
• Command TADIXS. Command TADIXS have as their purpose
both high command (that is, the connectivity between the
National Command Authorities to the tactical force
commander and the nodes in between) and force command
(that is, the TADIXS affecting the command and control
of tactical battle forces from the tactical commander to
his designated subordinates—CWC to CWC commanders and
units) whether Navy, joint, or allied. Both are
envisioned as multiformat, with the former including
video conferenceing;
• Support TADIXS. This category includes such diverse
information streams as an Environmental TADIXS, a
Logistics TADIXS, a Data Base-File Transfer TADIXS, an
Imagery TADIXS, and NAVIXS (Naval Information Exchange
System) which, as the narrative message pathway, is the
only TADIXS envisioned to carry that format. All other
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TADIXS, including those other than Support TADIXS, are
being designed in formats other than narrative messages;
Direct Targeting TADIXS. This category encompasses
several TADIXS and will include multisensor broadcast
that can be tailored for allies and filtered for
geographic and targeting differences; and
Force Operations TADIXS. This will be constructed around
the tactical force to produce the information flow to
answer the commander's tactical questions. For a
Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) , for example, Force
Operations TADIXS may be expected (in addition to the
three categories above) to include the following TADIXS
for a complex mission:
*ASW Information Exchange System (ASWIXS) , designed
to connect ASW platforms to the CCC and the ASW
GLOBIXS
;
*Strike TADIXS, set up to provide consolidated
overland targeting products and to connect Strike
platforms, the Strike Warfare Commander, and CCC
with the appropriate GLOBIXS;
*Real-time links, such as the Joint Tactical
Information Display System (JTIDS) , which will be
the primary conduits for AAW information;
^Integrated Special Intelligence Communications
(INSICOM) TADIXS which includes TACINTEL, the
Intelligence Network (INTELNET) , the Intelligence
Broadcast (INTELCAST) , MUS IC/Special
Intelligence (SI) Common, and the Operational
Intelligence (OPINTEL) functionalities; and
*Space and Electronic Warfare (SEW) TADIXS, designed
to connect the CCC SEW Center and the SEW commander
afloat.
This mix will be somewhat different for a JTF
commander, a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) , or an
amphibious task force.
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a. TADIXS Bearer Services
Central to Copernicus' requirements is the need
for the Navy to invest broadly in communications frequency
[EM spectrum] from HF and military SATCOM through commercial
satellite [Ref. 2:p. 6-7], Although it is anticipated that
the need for anti-jam capability inherent in EHF low data
rate (LDR) SATCOM will be modest, it will be much less
common than EHF medium data rate (MDR) SATCOM (Figure 2-9)
.
If technically feasible, the ability to shift from MDR to








Figure 2-9. Anti-Jam Core and General Purpose SATCOM,
[Ref. 2:p 6-15]
39
Developing a virtual networking TADIXS concept
offering both jamming protection and sufficient
communications capacity requires a new approach to procuring
and implementing the Navy's communications assets. Today,
Navy communications are effectively centered on ultra-high
frequency (UHF) . Existing high frequency (HF) equipment is
antiquated, requiring high manpower requirements in return
for low throughput. Super-high frequency (SHF) is only in
the developmental stages in the Navy, and extremely-high
frequency (EHF) availability and throughput will be limited.
Commercial satellite, like SHF, has the promise of adding
high data rate capacity to the Navy afloat platforms. [Ref.
2:p. 6-8]
Four critical shortfalls exist today in Navy
bearer services [Ref. 2:p. 6-8]. First, the Navy has not
invested in a broad range of means from HF systems through
MILSATCOM to commercial satellite which uses the frequency
spectrum lower than EHF and UHF. Second, it has proven
extremely difficult to make operational decisions concerning
information management due to the reliance on the narrative
message as driven by the sender and not the receiver.
Third, the means have not been developed to switch from one
RF asset to another—a key capability in a jamming
environment. Instead, the emphasis has been on designing an
ant i-jam waveform, thus trading off throughput as in MILSTAR
(recall that waveform anti-jamming techniques have a direct
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negative impact on throughput) . And fourth, a virtual
network allowing the efficient use of currently available
capacity has never been developed.
Although the Copernicus architecture is
addressing these problems, it should be recognized that
there are limits to data transfer capability in a tactical
environment [Ref. 2:p. 6-8]. What can be done in a business
environment ashore between computers on a fiber optic link
cannot yet be done over tactical links to afloat units. In
fact, with the advent of fiber optic ashore and shipboard
Local Area Networks (LANs) , the "stoplight" will be the
satellite link since military satellite throughput almost
always lags behind (Figure 2-10)
.
Various factors preclude a simple solution to the
throughput problem (for instance, the expense of a better
satellite, the limits of the physics of the spectrum, and
engineering of the waveform) . However, it is obvious that
the absolute maximum throughput must be achieved.
To do so, five general requirements must be met
by Navy bearer services (as approved by OP-094) [Ref. 2:p.
6-9] :
First, the Navy must move beyond near-total
reliance on UHF SATCOM to a broad spectrum of means to



















Figure 2-10. Data Capacity Chokepoint. [Ref. 2:p 6-9]
Second, an operating system must be overlaid to
allow many users to efficiently access the capacity on the
satellites through dynamic bandwidth management instead of
dedicated channels.
Third, research, development, test, and
evaluation must be conducted to explore better data transfer
techniques: data compression, object-oriented transmission
packets, "delta" transmissions (i.e., sending only the part
of data files that actually changes between transmissions)
.
Fourth, the Navy must procure a standard family
of workstations and file servers afloat with ever-increasing
amounts of memory. Bear in mind that memory is far cheaper
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than satellite transponders. Thus, the more memory resident
at sea, the less data necessary to send and the smaller the
"delta" for transmission.
And fifth, replace antiquated communications
processors with a common family of faster, more efficient
processors.
b. A TADIXS Model
Five elements define any TADIXS. Using those
elements, a model can then be developed in much the same
manner that a tactical commander would activate a TADIXS in
execution of a mission using the architecture.
• First element of a TADIXS is the user software, that is,
the FASTT HMI, and data addressing.
• Second element is the decision to define the data—the
communication service—to be sent over the TADIXS in
terms of format, whether voice, video, or Copernicus
Common Format (COPCOM)
.
• Third element is subscribership and the terms of
subscribership. This element is part of the process of
"toggling" the GLOBIXS, but it is important to recognize
there is a need to "toggle" other TADIXS subscribers on
the net as well. The tactical commander can, therefore,
send what communications service must be established—by
precedence as well as format.
• Fourth element is duration. The TADIXS is established
as a "permanent" TADIXS, which is to say it is on line
for the duration of the mission as opposed to a distinct
time frame
.
• Final element is the communications pathway. This
decision, made by the staff communicator, is a function
of available path, data format, degree of jam-resistance
required, the capabilities of other TADIXS subscribers,
and the duration of the TADIXS (Figure 2-11)
.
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4. Tactical Command Center (TCC) System Description
In the Copernicus Architecture, the TCC is intended
to signify the combat "nerve centers" of the tactical
commander and his units. Thus, TCC in Copernicus means not
USER HMVDATA ADDRESS
3 SERVICE







Figure 2-11. Five Elements of a, Model TADIXS. [Ref. 2:p
6-14]
only the TFCC, CIC, CVIC, SUPPLOT, and SSES in an aircraft
carrier or analogous centers on a fleet flagship, but also
the tactical centers for individual units and the command
centers for multi-force commanders such as the MAGTF and
JTF. [Ref. 2:p. 7-2]
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The TCC provides the tactical displays, integrated
information management, and accessibility to tactical
communications to support Navy warfighting missions. It
provides the requisite battle connectivity to units, other
force commanders, and to the CCC. Architecturally, the TCC
is analogous to the ashore command center, the CCC. Both
will share a consistent tactical picture and connect the
Navy to the Services and to allies at the tactical level and
the theater level. [Ref. 2: p. 7-2]
Local area networks (LANs) on ships have increased
the ability to handle the time critical information that
must be continuously updated. These LANs will have high
bandwidth and provide high speed connectivity for all the
TCC spaces. [Ref. 2:p. 7-3] These information LANs will be
characterized by different protocols but will operate
Copernicus Fleet All Source Tactical Terminal (FASTT)
workstations (with application specific software) and
receive data from various TADIXS. The LANs will be
supported by various utilities and servers providing high
speed message search retrieval, E-mail, and other common
user functions. [Ref. 2:p. 7-3]
Using the FASTTs and LAN concept, the tactical
commander achieves an agility in construction of his command
and control that heretofore was not possible. The final
ingredient is the virtual TADIXS mix which, when shunted
onto the LANs to the diverse FASTTs, allows the CWC to
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actually configure his command and control technology to his
tactical doctrine to suit the mission. Copernicus, then,
provides the CWC with the following unique capabilities:
• The TCC can be configured and reconfigured quickly to
suit the changing tactical situation;
• The high-technology FASTT can assimilate, sort, and
display large amounts of sensor reports, data files, and
imagery onto a warfare specific software-making the
notion of isolated imagery or data files, now placed in
the context of the mission-analytics and fed onto the
LAN through the TADIXS, obsolete;
• The construction of virtual TADIXS in common formats-an
ASW sensor report in the Copernicus Architecture is
formatted identically to an Electronic Intelligence
(ELINT) report- allows the CWC to make decisions about
which subordinates receive which data, when, and how;
• The advent of the CSS workstation allows the CWC to
determine which information is protected by the core of
anti-jam media and which is not. Thus, the CWC is
provided both reliability and efficiency by his own
choice; and
• The CCC, through the addressing of data packets and the
configuration of the Global Information Exchange System
(GLOBIXS) nodes tailored for each tactical commander can
act as facilitator or filter or both, as the CWC
directs. [Ref. 2:p. 7-3]
The TCC encompasses the whole complex of afloat and
command activities. Whereas the existing TFCC is merely one
space within a flag-configured ship, the TCC will provide an
integrated construct that includes not only the TFCC itself,
but also the other spaces in which force management
functions are performed such as CVIC, SSES, SUPPLOT, Combat
Direction Center (CDC), and radio. [Ref. 2:p. 7-7]
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a. Description of the Operational Model
TCCs support numbered fleet commanders, battle
force/battle group commanders, amphibious task force
commanders, and CWCs to enable them to exercise their
responsibilities whether as naval force commanders, joint
task organization commanders, or allied force commanders.
TCCs help the tactical commander to:
• Respond to Fleet Commanders in Chief (FLTCINC) , JTF
commander, and allied force commanders, directives and
policies;
• Coordinate battle group, battle force, and/or amphibious
force operations in crisis, wartime, and peacetime
environments
;
• Prepare, evaluate, and promulgate mission and mission
warfare plans, orders, and tactical decisions;
• Allocate/reallocate assigned resources including dynamic
reconfiguration of communications assets support;
• Assess and predict tactical situations and own force
readiness;
• Plan transits, search and rescue operations; manage
catastrophic civilian relief efforts; perform air/water
space management. The TCC also plans frequency usage
and manage communication and information management
systems, assists with drug surveillance and interdiction
support operations; and conduct operational planning as
well as overall information management;
• Provide all elements (Red-Hostile, White-Neutral, Blue-
Friendly, Green-Environmental) of the near-real-time
tactical picture and ensure a consistent tactical
picture within the force to enable indications and
warnings; intelligence support; cryptologic, imagery,
and other surveillance support; own force status and
disposition monitoring; logistics support to own force;
as well as consolidation of environmental/geophysical
data
;
• Coordinate own force operations with those of other
forces and ashore commands;
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• Provide correlated, evaluated organic and non-organic,
multisource tracks and amplifying information to own
forces and to the CCC ashore;
• Prepare targeting information and/or targeting support
information;
• Plan for and manage assigned collection resources and
coordinate the application of non-organic collection
resources
;
• Evaluate warfare and warfare support system performance
and contribution to mission plan success;
• Reconstitute forces after action;
• Restore communication links and networks after natural
or man-made degradation;
• Reconstruct and analyze completed exercises/actions; and
• Plan for, monitor, assess, observe and report on their
delegated warfare tasks in response to the CWC's
directives, policies, and resource allocations. Mission
warfare commanders:
Coordinate with each other when the force is
engaged in multi-warfare operations; coordinate with
afloat and ashore-based counterparts when operating
in multi-force operations;
Prepare, evaluate, and select mission warfare and
warfare support plans; promulgate the plans;
Allocate/reallocate assigned resources;
Direct and coordinate assigned forces mission
warfare operations;
Assess situations; evaluate outcomes as opposed to
expectations
;
Develop and implement preplanned actions/force
doctrines; and




The TCC functions are derived from four
subsystems or categories: information distribution,
information processing, briefing and display, and
facilities.
The information distribution subsystem connects
the TCC information processing subsystem components located
in various flagship spaces with each other and with the
briefing and display subsystem located in the command
center. A gateway connects this TCC local area network with
the flagship CSS for interface with other force platforms,
with shore-based commands and command support centers, and,
in some instances, with non-organic sensors. The subsystem
provides all requisite communication system
interoperability, compatibility, adaptability,
reconfigurability, and security. [Ref. 2:p. 7-9]
The information processing subsystem provides a
single integrated capability for users to access all
processing resources based on their requirements and
authorized data/application program access. The following
capabilities are needed in the TCC information processing
subsystem:
• Data interfaces with platform support systems (e.g.,
ACDS, ASW Module, Prototype Ocean Surveillance
Terminal)
;
• Data interfaces with the platform CSS;
• Data protocol compatibility among subsystems;
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• Automated message handling;
• Multilevel security;
• LAN with access to platform LANs to permit TCC
subscribers to share authorized intra- and inter-
platform command and support center data, applications,
and various terminal devices;
• Standardized user interfaces across all applications and
decision aids;
• Office automation;
• Data management and storage in a relational data base
environment;
• Integration of imagery processing, storage, and
distribution into development of organic and non-organic
tactical pictures and situation assessments;
• High resolution (targeting quality) geographic and
topographic maps with capabilities to overlay
standardized user-friendly icons and the capability to
pan, zoom, convert, re-register, and to annotate the
maps with narrative or graphic data to support mission
planning;
• User-oriented tactical decision aids including,
planning, assessment, and optimization models;
• Briefing preparation; and
• Report generation. [Ref. 2:p. 7-9, 7-10]
The briefing and display subsystem is comprised
of video switches, controllers, large screen displays,
monitors, and video conferencing and audiovisual support
equipment. [Ref. 2: p. 7-10] It uses multi-media windows
displays that allow the user to create the desired
combinations of information needed to fit the mission.
The facility subsystem provides the space, power,
environment controls, and human support responsive to the
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needs of TCC including decision makers, watchstanders,
analysis, maintenance, and administrative personnel. [Ref.
2:p. 7-10]
E. RELATED PROGRAMS
In the preceding discussion it was mentioned several
times that the GLOBIXS would be linked by the use of the
DCS. The reasoning behind this is to shift the perspective
of communications from the Naval Computers and
Telecommunications Area Master Stations (NCTAMS) to the
fleet command center (FCC) and the tactical flag command
center (TFCC)
.
[Ref . 3:p. 90] However, the system must be
able to interface with two network services. These consist
of the following:
(1) commercial or government services available to
common users, and
(2) open-system based networks adapted for the Navy
tactical environment.
Commercial or government common-user services will be
used among the shore establishment: headquarters and
operation centers ashore, other support and administrative
centers, and research and development centers. These
services, in the Copernicus application, are referred to as
Global Information Exchange Systems (GLOBIXS) . GLOBIXS
services will be based on commercial Integrated Services
Digital Network (ISDN) , Broadband ISDN, federal ISDN/BISDN,
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Government Open System Information Profile (GOSIP) services,
Defense Data Network (DDN) , or Defense Commercial
Telecommunications Network (DCTN) . The choice of which
service to use in a particular application will be based on
mission suitability and cost. [Ref. 5:p. 37]
The following programs, either in existence or under
development, have been found complementary to the Copernicus
Program, as contained in the Phase I Requirements Document
[Ref. 2:p. 4-24, 4-25, 5-14, 5-15, 6-15, 6-16, 6-17, 7-10,
7-11]
:
1. GLOBIXS Related Programs
The following programs in existences or under
development have been found to be compatible with the
GLOBIXS concept and in many instances will be incorporated
into the GLOBIXS system as a whole.
• Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) : AUTODIN is a
digital record traffic system operated as part of the
DCS that provides world-wide connectivity to the U.S.
unified and specified commands and to the Services. The
AUTODIN system will be phased into the Defense Message
System (DMS) by the year 2 000.
• Automated Network Control Center (ANCC) : The ANCC will
be a shore-based, interactive, real-time system capable
of facilitating the overall operation of technical
control and data operation facilities by automating
functions that are presently performed manually. It
will support the Naval Computer and Telecommunications
System (NCTS) and DCS technical control functions as
well as provide interface capability for commercial and
DOD transmission systems. The ANCC will serve as the
hub for communications circuits passing through a shore-
based communications station.
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• Base Information Transfer System (BITS) : BITS defines
the future structure of communications systems on Navy
bases and stations. It is the integrated voice, data,
image, message, and video communications architecture
for intrabase communications and support of ships at
pierside. The target architecture will be accomplished
in 1996 and beyond.
• Classic Lightning (Formerly Navy Key Distribution System
(NKDS) ) : Classic Lightning is a system designed to
transition cryptographic key distribution from a paper-
based system to an automated electronic system.
• Communication Support System (CSS) : CSS is a
communications program designed to enhance battle force
communications connectivity, flexibility, and
survivability through multimedia access and dynamic link
sharing. It will permit users to share total network
capacity on a priority demand basis in accordance with a
specified communications plan.
• Defense Commercial Telecommunications Network (DCTN) :
DCTN, a leased communications system, is a Defense
Information Systems Agency (DISA) operated
telecommunications network that provides routine common-
user switched voice, dedicated voice/data, and video
conferencing services throughout the United States. It
is a fully integrated digital system that uses a mix of
satellite (TELSTAR 3) and terrestrial transmission
paths. The DCTN contract terminates in 1996.
• Defense Data Network (DDN) : The DDN is a worldwide
digital packet switched network, operated as a long-haul
backbone transmission system by the DISA. It currently
provides near-worldwide coverage in support of
operational systems, including the World Wide Military
Command and Control System (WWMCCS) and intelligence
systems, as well as general purpose ADP and command-
based data networks with long haul communications
requirements. DDN uses packet-switching technology and
currently consists of four separate networks operating
at different security levels: MILNET (unclassified)
,
DSNET1 (secret) , DSNET2 (top secret) , DSNET3 (SCI) . The
three DSNETS are presently being merged into a DISNET
that includes survivable links (through redundancy) , and
uses the X.25 protocol for network access, the X.400 for
messages, and the X.500 for directory services. Bulk
encryption is accomplished with a BLACKER encryption
system.
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• Defense Message System (DMS) : DMS is a flexible X.400
based system that will provide a store and forward
service via the use of a "Universal Mailbox" supporting
the full range of information media. Over the next 3-4
years, E-Mail will migrate from the DOD Simple Mail
Transfer Protocol (SMTP) to the Government Open System
Interconnection Protocol (GOSIP) X.400. By 1995, a DMS
implementation will begin phasing out AUTODIN by
providing an X.400/X.500 based system on DDN that
provides both the AUTODIN (organizational) and E-Mail
(individual) grades of service. DMS will provide a
secure desktop-to-desktop messaging system that will
phase out AUTODIN and close most telecommunications
centers by the year 2000.
• Defense Switched Network (DSN) : The DSN is the primary
DOD telecommunications network and evolved from the
existing AUTOVON system. It will provide multi-level
precedence and pre-emption for clear and secure voice
services in conjunction with the Red Switch and Secure
Telephone Unit III (STU-III) projects of the Secure
Voice System (SVS) . Upon full implementation in the
mid-1990s, the DSN will interconnect all U.S. military
bases worldwide to provide terminal-to-terminal, long
distance common user and dedicated telephone, data,
teleconferencing, and video services.
• Federal Telecommunications System (FTS) 2000: FTS2000
is a General Services Administration (GSA) managed
digital telecommunications system utilizing leased
capabilities for a government-wide network that will be
interoperable with DSN and DCTN. It will provide
switched voice, switched data, video transmission,
packet-switched data, dedicated transmission service
(voice to 1.544 Mbps) , and switched integrated services
using Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) or T-l
trunks. AT&T and U.S. Sprint are the FTS2000
contractors. Access to FTS2000 will be via dedicated
lines from government locations called Service Delivery
Points (SDPs)
.
2. CINC Command Complex (CCC) Related Programs
The following programs in existence or under
development have been found to be compatible with the CCC
concept and in many instances will be incorporated into the
CCC system as a whole.
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• Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS) Baseline
Upgrade and OSIS Evolutionary Development (OBU/OED) :
The OBU/OBE provides automated receipt, processing,
fusion and dissemination of all-source surveillance and
intelligence data of interest to fleet and command
authorities. Intelligence and event-by-event data is
supplied to forces afloat for tactical support and over-
the-horizon targeting (OTH-T) in a timely manner.
• Operations Support System (OSS) : OSS is a system
evolving from the functionalities of the Navy WWMCCS
Standard Software, Operations Support Group Prototype,
Fleet Command Center Battle Management Program, and
Joint Operational Tactical System (JOTS) . The CINC staff
uses JOTS II and a JOTS variant the Joint Visually
Integrated Display System (JVIDS) , in the current
partially integrated OSS. OSS is converging the
functionalities of these developments into: (1) a single
operations and logistics plan development and
assessment; and (2) resource allocation planning and
optimization, processing, preparation, and
dissemination. The Information Processing and
Dissemination System (IPDS) is being developed for the
Naples relocation project and is intended to be the
first Copernican CCC.
• aswoc Modernization: ASWOC is a shore-based, on-line
interactive, real-time netted system to support the
missions of the Maritime Patrol Aircraft Sector
Commander. ASWOC provides mission planning assistance,
in-flight support and post-flight analysis for ASW,
ocean surveillance, OTH-T, and Anti-Surface Ship Warfare
(ASUW) missions. ASWOC also supports Battle Force (BF)
,
Battle Group (BG) , Surface Action Group (SAG) , and Towed
Array Surveillance System (TASS) and Tactical Towed
Array Surveillance System (TACTASS) units operating in
or transitioning through ASWOC sectors, with pertinent
tactical information. The twenty ASWOC sites are
currently undergoing a modernization program to
transition the system to COE hardware and software
elements. The program incorporates DTC-2 computers and
selected COTS/GFE software in a LAN based architecture.
• Fleet Imagery Support Terminal (FIST) : FIST provides a
capability for worldwide transmission of imagery between
USN forces ashore and afloat using military satellite
communications systems. Hard copy imagery is digitized
at the originating site, transmitted via satellite, and
permanently recorded at the receiving site. The
receiving site can display the imagery on a high-
resolution cathode ray tube display or convert the
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display to hard copy. The terminal can enlarge,
annotate, and enhance imagery for further analysis.
WWMCCS ADP Modernization (WAM) : WAM is a joint program
to redesign and replace the ADP systems within WWMCCS.
Key elements include modernization of software
(translation from COBOL to Ada) , implementation of Joint
Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) , and
the installation of additional elements of the National
Military Command System (NMCS) as directed. The DISA is
the lead agency.
3. TADIXS Related Programs
The following programs in existences or under
development have been found to be compatible with the TADIXS
concept and in many instances will be incorporated into the
TADIXS system as a whole.
• Advanced Narrowband Digital Voice Terminal (ANDVT) : A
secure digital voice or data traffic device for use over
narrowband voice frequency channels on aircraft, ships,
or land vehicles.
• Combination Radio (COMBO RADIO) : Designated the AN/ARC-
210, it provides anti-jam (voice) communications in the
UHF and very-high frequency (VHF) portion of the
spectrum. The primary application is for AAW and close
air support (CAS) operations. It is applicable to the
F/A-18, the AF-8B, F-14D, E-2C, EA-6B, AH-1, CH-53, UH-
1N, OV-10, and EP-3. It promotes interoperability with
Department of Defense (DOD) and allied HAVEQUICK and
Single Channel Ground to Air Radio System (SINCGARS)
.
• HAVEQUICK: A UHF LOS frequency-hopping, jam-resistant
communications system developed by the Air Force for
tactical voice applications. It is provided as an
applique to existing radios used by the various services
and some North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
allies. In the Navy, it is used with the AN/WCS-3, and
the AN/ARC-182. HAVEQUICK IIA is the NATO standard.
• High Speed Fleet Broadcast (HSFB) : The HSFB is
comprised of individually encrypted broadcast packages
generated from multiple user subsystems. Multiplexing
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of the subsystem outputs enables sharing of available
satellite capacity and at the same time allows
flexibility in altering bit rates in response to varying
operational needs and environments. HSFB is transmitted
through the MO-51 spread-spectrum modem and the AN/FSC-
79 terminal and through broadcast keying and re-keying
sites for HF. Mobile platforms receive the HSFB via the
modified AN/SSR-1 satellite communications broadcast or
the HF receiver in conjunction with an NDI modem using
serial tone modulation techniques in accordance with
MIL-STD 188-110 CN2
.
• Joint Tactical Information Distribution System and
Multifunctional Information Distribution System
(JTIDS/MIDS) : JTIDS is a program to provide selected
air, sea, and ground units with a crypto-secure, jam-
resistant, low-probability-of exploitation tactical data
and voice communications system. It will have the
additional capabilities of common-grid navigation and
the use of automatic relay. MIDS is a pre-planned
product improvement (P3I) of the JTIDS Class 2 terminal.
As such, it will utilize the Link-16 message standard
and will be applicable to the F/A-18 and E-2C. MIDS
offers a substantial reduction in size as compared to
the Class 2 terminal.
• Link Eleven Improvement Program (LEIP) : A program
designed to improve existing Link 11 high-speed,
computer-to-computer digital radio communications in the
HF and UHF bands among Combat Direction System (CDS)
equipped ships, submarines, aircraft, and shore sites.
• Navy Standard Teleprinter (NST) : A program to replace
outdated teletypes (TTYs) with the UGC-143A(V)
teleprinter. The new item is modular and can be
configured in four versions (receive only, receive only
with bulk storage, keyboard send/receive, auto
send/receive) . Installation on ships began in FY91.
• Officer in Tactical Command Information Exchange
Subsystem II (OTCIXS) : A Demand Assigned Multiple
Access (DAMA) -capable tactical satellite communications
network for command and control of Battle Group
operations and ship-to-ship or ship-to-shore exchange of
data link and teletype information. It is to provide
dependable beyond line of sight (BLOS) communications
between surface, sub-surface, and shore installations on
a near-real-time basis.
• Super High Frequency (SHF) Satellite Communications for
Aircraft Carriers (CV) and Flagships: The only ships
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that currently have capability to use Defense Satellite
Communication System (DSCS) SHF SATCOM are the numbered
fleet commander flagships. The SHF SATCOM for
CV/Flagships program will expand this capability to
aircraft carriers and other ships designated as being
capable of supporting an embarked flag officer. The
operational service to be provided is being determined.
At a minimum, the capability will be similar to existing
AN/WSC-6 (V) 2 , providing approximately 9600 bps capacity
in a benign electronic combat environment. Alternative
capabilities that could enable higher data rates are
under consideration.
• Super High Frequency (SHF) Satellite Communications
(SATCOM) : An existing Navy program that provides
AN/WSC-6 (V) 1 capability for Surface Towed Array
Surveillance System (SURTASS) and AN/WSC-6 (V) 2 for
Numbered Fleet Commander flagships. The SURTASS system
has no anti-jam capability and operates at 64 kbps in a
benign anti-jam environment. The combatant ship system
(AN/WCS-6(V) 2 with OM-55 anti-jam modem) operates at a
nominal maximum of 32 kbps (actual rate is between
22,000 bps and 48,000 bps) in a benign electronic combat
environment and degrades to 75 bps in a moderately
severe electronic combat environment.
• Submarine Satellite Information Exchange System (SSIXS
II) : SSIXS provides a means to use the UHF FLTSATCOM
system for a 4800 bps, two-way exchange of text messages
between shore-based Submarine Operating Authorities
(SUBOPAUTHs) and submarines, and between submarines.
SSIXS II is a system block upgrade that replaced the
AN/UYK-2 processor hardware and software in shore sites
with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and Ada
software.
• Integrated SI Communication (INSICOM) : This program
supports Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)
exchange required in support of AAW, ASUW, STW, ASW, and
Amphibious Warfare (AMW) operations. It will operate on
HF, UHF LOS, and UHF, SHF, and EHF SATCOM simultaneously
or any mix of those systems. INSICOM provides
capabilities previously expressed by the INTELCAST and
INTELNET programs. It will be capable of netted, point-
to-point, or broadcast communications, and INTELCAST
will support many information exchange formats.
• UHF Line of Sight (LOS) : UHF LOS radios are used for
voice and data (Link 11) information exchange among
fleet units. Voice may be either clear or encrypted,
with VINSON (KY-57/KY-58) used for on-line encryption.
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All fleet units have some UHF LOS capability. Only
anti-air warfare ships, submarines, and some aircraft
have UHF LOS Link 11. Ships use secure teletype (KG-84A
or KG-84C) via UHF LOS for intra-battle group message
exchange when within UHF LOS range (approximately 3
nm) . UHF LOS equipment is predominantly the AN/WSC-3
.
Most UHF LOS equipment has no anti-jam capability, but
the HAVEQUICK frequency-hopping applique is being
provided for combat aircraft and for primary air control
ships that communicate with combat aircraft.
UHF Satellite Communication (SATCOM) : UHF SATCOM is
used for voice and data information exchange among fleet
units. Most combatants have at least one Demand
Assigned Multiple Acces (TD-1271 DAMA) unit to multiplex
as many as four user information streams (at 4800 bps or
lower) into one carrier frequency up/down link. Voice
is covered by one of four voice encryption systems: (1)
CV-3333 Narrowband Secure Voice with KG-3 series
COMMSEC, (2) Advanced Narrowband Digital Voice Terminal
(ANDVT, in the AN/USC-4 3 configuration that is replacing
CV-3333), (3) Parkhill (KY-65 or KY-75) , and (4) VINSON
(KY-57 or KY-58) . Data capability includes secure
teletype (KG-84A or KG-84C COMSEC) and the automatic
information exchange systems listed below. All
combatants have UHF SATCOM capability. UHF SATCOM
radios afloat are the AN/WSC-3. The AN/WSC-5 is the
principal radio for use ashore. Portable radios (AN/PSC-
3 or AN/URC-110) are used for special operations (in
some cases) to provide a special capability for a ship.
Current automatic information exchange systems that
operate via UHF SATCOM include:
Officer in Tactical Command Information Exchange
System (OTCIXS)
;
Tactical Data Information Exchange System (TADIXS
A);
Tactical Intelligence Information Exchange System
(TACINTEL)
;
Fleet Imagery Support Terminal (FIST)
;
Common User Digital Information Exchange System
(CUDIXS) ; and
Submarine Information Exchange System (SSIXS)
.
4. TCC Related Programs
There is one major program element that is making
significant progress toward attaining Copernicus TCC
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capability: Navy Tactical Command System Afloat (NTCS-A)
.
This program has several elements, some of which are
described below:
• The Joint Operational Tactical System (JOTS) : JOTS work
stations, the primary TFCC system component, host common
tactical data processing and display software running in
standard hardware for the OTC/CWC, CATF and CLF and
selected subordinate warfare commanders. At present,
JOTS II software is the core of NTCS-A, used in
conjunction with Navy Desktop Tactical Computer 2 (DTC-
2) hardware onboard both TCC and some non-TCC units.
System functionality includes track management, track
analysis, environment prediction, and a variety of
tactical overlays as well as Tactical Decision Aids
(TDAs) /displays. JOTS is capable of receiving Link 11,
Link 14, TADIXS A, OTCIXS, High Interest Track (HIT)
Broadcasts, Operational Intelligence, and U.S. Message
Text Format (USMTF) messages. Link 16 data will be
processed when the Joint Tactical Information
Distribution System (JTIDS) is introduced into the
fleet. The tactical data base manager (TDBM) provides a
consistent tactical picture for all supporting warfare
commanders. The Fleet Command Centers (FCCs) interface
with flag configured ships and other shore nodes via a
JOTS variant, JVIDS (Joint Visually Integrated Display
System) . Data is exchanged ship-shore via the Fleet
Broadcast, the SI broadcast and Ocean Surveillance
Product (OSP) , and among shipboard nodes via OTCIXS and
the HIT Broadcast in Over-The-Horizon (OTH) Gold and/or
tactical report (TACREP) formats.
• Electronic Warfare Coordination Module (EWCM) : The EWCM
was designed to provide planning, decision aids, and
automated data processing support for the CWC/OTC and
Electronic Warfare Coordinator (EWC) . The EWCM
requirements package has now been folded into NTCS-A as
the Electronic Combat (EC) module with software
supporting EW functions performed in sea control and
power projection operations. The EW Module is being
implemented in both the SCI and GENSER NTCS
architectures and is the core support package for the
SEWC. It supports tactical planning, direction and
redirection not only of EC resources for coordination of
"soft kill," counter-threat command and control,
communications, computers and intelligence counter
measures (C ICM) operations to degrade the enemy's
command and control, but also to provide C I
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countermeasures and targeting support for other warfare
commanders.
• The Afloat Correlation System (ACS) : ACS was to be a
ship-based, on-line, interactive, near-real-time support
system for automated correlation, fusion and other
analytical manipulation of multi-source threat
information. The ACS was to be installed in TFCC-
equipped ships. ACS requirements have been folded into
NTCS-A as software supporting the sea control and power
projection mission planning, execution, and threat
monitoring functions. SCI and GENSER ACS functionally
supports the TFCC and interfaces with the FCCs (through
their collocated Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information
Centers [FOSICs]). ACS functionally is used to
correlate the ACDS organic picture with off-board sensor
derived, non-organic tactical data to provide the
OTC/CWC with a single, comprehensive and consistent
tactical picture. Primary offboard inputs are the
shore-generated Ocean Surveillance Product (OSP) via
TADIXS A, organic data maintained by the ACDS, and non-
organic data received from various communications links
such as TADIXS B, TACINTEL and the SI broadcast.
Providing limited interim correlator capabilities are
POST for sea and the Advanced Tracking Prototype (ATP)
ashore. In FY92, POST and ATP will be replaced by NTCS
software that will field an improved correlation
algorithm for land as well as sea tracking on DTC-2
workstations
.
• The Naval Intelligence Processing System (NIPS) : NIPS
supports analysis packaging and distribution of
intelligence data for the OTC/CWC, CATF/CLF and
subordinate warfare commanders/coordinators. It
directly supports strike and amphibious warfare by
providing a resource for mission planning and
organization; intelligence assessment and evaluation;
photographic and electronic imagery transmission,
receipt, interpretation, and exploitation;
reconnaissance planning and analysis; and aircrew
briefing and debriefing. NIPS will have separate GENSER
and SCI processors: a GENSER-to-SCI data base update
scheme will generate an all-source tactical picture at
the SCI level to support OTC/CWC and especially SEW SCI
resources management as well as tactical intelligence
and warning (I&W) and GENSER data base quality assurance
(Q.A.). Evolving to become the NTCS-A central data base
server (CDBS) , NIPS contains technical data on friendly,
neutral, and threat systems as well as characteristics
and performance (C&P) data, orders of battle, and other
capabilities. Based on the Naval Warfare Tactical Data
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Base (NWTDB) , this data base provides easily accessible
information in support of other NTCS-A components and
Combat Systems such as ACDS, Tactical Air Mission
Planning System (TAMPS) and Tactical EA-6 Mission
Planning System (TEAMS) . The NIPS data base, prepared
by the JIC/FIC prior to deployment, is tailored to
project force operational requirements, but will be
updatable through a combination of electrical data
transmission, tapes and manual entry. Near-term
upgrades to NIPS will include porting the software to




Navy shore activities enjoy the full support of Navy
information processing resources. Some ships also enjoy
that technology when in port. But for the most part, ships
at sea are not integrated into an information processing
architecture. The Navy's ships and crews need the same
information systems support that their ashore counterparts
enjoy. The Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station
(NCTS) Washington recently demonstrated that the means
currently exist to generate this type of system. [Ref. 6: p.
1] Additionally, technology upgrade programs are currently
in the development stages that will allow the system to move
beyond these initial capabilities.
1. The Demonstration of Ashore/Afloat Long-Haul
Communication
NCTS Washington recently demonstrated the first
phase of an "extension" to the long-haul communications
architecture, using the Defense Data Network (DDN) , that
will connect ships at sea with each other and with ashore
activities. NCTS Washington accomplished this by
implementing a Serial Line Internet Protocol (SLIP) facility
that allows a dial user to use DOD Internet protocols
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(TCP/IP) over asynchronous circuits. The next logical step
in this process will be to establish a similar connection
over satellite voice circuits. During this demonstration,
NCTS Washington used 9600 bps International Maritime
Satellite (INMARSAT) circuits. [Ref. 6:p. 1]
Figure 3-1 shows a mock-up of two "ships" , USS Blue
and the USS Gold. The ships may establish communications
with each other or to ashore activities on DDN via INMARSAT
and the SLIP Server at NCTS Washington. This concept has
been demonstrated on board MSC ships, and currently NCTS
Washington is working with the NAVSEA-sponsored
Intelligence, Command and Control (IC2) demonstrations at
the Surface Weapons Center at Wallops Island and Dahlgren,
Virgina. The purpose of the demonstration by NCTS
Washington was to show that the process works on a ship-to-
shore links.
USS Gold is a mock-up of a shipboard LAN. One
personal computer (PC) is a portable operating system
interface for a computer equipment (POSIX) compliant UNIX
system that might be the LAN server on board a ship and
which has SLIP software on it. UNIX is used in order that
multiple sessions from LAN TCP/IP hosts can be handled. The
SLIP software allows the PC to send TCP/IP over an
asynchronous circuit via a 9600 bps modem and INMARSAT.
This system acts as both a gateway and as a router for the
LAN architecture. [Ref. 6:p. 3]
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Figure 3-1. Ship to Shore. [Ref. 6:p. 1]
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The other PC is a simple LAN disk operating system
(DOS) workstation equipped with TCP/IP software and
registered as an internet (DDN) host. Electronic mail, file
transfer and interactive sessions may be initiated from the
LAN workstation, via gateway, to other Internet hosts. [Ref.
6:p. 3]
USS Blue represents a ship that does not have a LAN.
It has a DOS PC equipped with SLIP software and a 9600 baud
modem. Electronic mail, file transfer and interactive
sessions may be initiated from this PC to any other
connected Internet host whether it be afloat or ashore.
The demonstration represents a first phase
capability. On board ship, the screens needed to be made
simpler, and there needs to be more identification with
daily ship data flow. The long-haul link needs to be
upgraded from its current protocol to Government Open
Systems Interconnection Profile (GOSIP) , there is a need to
use routers afloat rather than SLIP technology, and there is
a need to use high-speed digital channels rather than voice
channels. Other typical Navy data communication links also
need to be explored. Ashore, there needs to be a more
general distribution and audit trail service. There also is
some work being done on AUTODIN interface, which is of
special interest to MSC ships. [Ref. 6:p. 2, 4 to 5]
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B. JOINT SERVICE EFFORTS
The completion of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm
brought to the forefront the necessity of joint operations
and the need for interoperability among the services to
accomplish them successfully. There are several initiatives
under development that each of the services hope will be
adopted as "the joint application" for the other services to
follow. These efforts are significant to the future of
Copernicus because some of the efforts, like the Army
Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) and the Air
Force Communications-Computer Systems Architecture (AFCCSA)
,
have been underway prior to Copernicus and thus make crucial
the issues of compatibility and interoperability.
1. Copernicus Adoption as Tri-Service System
The U.S. Senate has transferred close to $1 billion
from the 1992 budgets of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and
has transferred the majority of these funds to central
Defense Department accounts managed by the Corporate
Information Management (CIM) office. [Ref. 7:p. 8] As the
Navy's lead program focusing on the CIM effort, Copernicus
has emerged as the strongest candidate for a standard, tri-
service C I system. [Ref. 8:p. 10]
The Copernicus Architecture has received strong
backing from both the Senate Armed Services Committee and
Duane Andrews, Assistant Secretary of Defense for C4I, as a
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standard system under DOD's CIM program. As Mr. Andrews
states, "Copernicus has attractive features; it does a good
4job in articulating what we want in C I. It is a leading
candidate to become a standard. CIM will help to see what
we can do to make it [tri-service] . " [Ref. 8: p. 10]
The key goal of Copernicus is to develop a standard
graphical user interface for all DOD information systems.
It intends to accomplish this by adhering to the CIM open-
systems principles calling for the use of software
standards, such as Unix, the Government Open Systems
Interconnection Profile (GOSIP) , Motif and X Windows.
2. Joint System Requirements
During Phase II development of the Copernicus
Architecture, allowances have been made for a Joint Team to
develop a Joint Model that could be incorporated into the
Copernicus Architecture as a whole. This effort will focus
on the diversity of the communications services currently in
existence and look at developing virtual networking with
choices of services, both in format and in media.
Further, with the close of the Cold War era, the
present C I system now faces the necessity to develop and
disseminate information on a far broader category of
potential threats. As stated earlier, an intelligence
infrastructure must be constructed that can allow a Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst assigned to a specific
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problem to be in contact with colleagues within the DIA, the
State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) , and
in industry who are also working daily on the same problem
but from a different angle. The information generated must
be moved to the US tactical commander, in a structured,
efficient, tactical context, on short notice. [Ref. 2:p. 2-
2]
As current world events have shown dramatic change,
so has the focus of U.S. national security interests. There
is still the need for nuclear deterrence with the former
Soviet Union. However, the United States must plan for
multiple, unrelated crises and regional conflicts falling
under the definition of Contingency and Limited Objective
Warfare (CALOW) missions, a warfare environment of
increasing significance. [Ref. 2:p. 2-4]
Future emphasis must be on stability of operations
and on crises that can occur in one or more regions
simultaneously with little or no warning. U.S. commanders
will need at least as much, if not more, flexibility and
combat power in the future for these "come as you are"
scenarios. Operational tempos will take on a joint and
combined acceleration (Figure 3-2) . Joint C I and battle
management will be a prequisite in a CALOW environment.
U.S. forces must be able to control the battle space











































Figure 3-2. Joint Force Sequencing For Maritime Presence
and Power Projection. [Ref. 2:p 2-5]
CALOW missions will expose naval forces to a
plethora of opposing weapons systems on an extremely complex
battle field. The trend towards higher technology weapons
will demand robust, close-in and overland air defense and a
connective system of C I that enhances joint and allied
capabilities. [Ref. 2:p. 2-5]
Maintaining the lead in advanced technologies is
critical to success in combat. Naval forces must be
prepared for instant response to the threat posed by
sophisticated First-World weaponry in the possession of
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Third-World adversaries. Enhanced capabilities in battle
management and interoperability of C I systems are and will
be prerequisites for future joint and combined operations.
3. Other Services Initiatives
In response to a recognized need for more joint
applications and the evident lack of compatibility among the
services (especially during Operation Urgent Fury and, more
recently, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm) , the
services have undertaken to develop what each hopes will be
considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as "the joint
operations platform" for all services. This section will
endeavor to describe the Marine Tactical Automated Command
and Control System/Amphibious Assault Networking Technology
(MTACCS/AANT) , the Air Force Communications-Computer Systems
Architecture (AFCCSA) , and the Army Tactical Command and
Control System (ATCCS)
.
a. U. S. Marine Corps
(1) Marine Tactical Automated Command and
Control System (MTACCS)
The Marine Tactical Automated Command and
Control System (MTACCS) will provide the capability to
combine desired information from individual systems into an
integrated system in support of the Marine Air Ground Task
Force (MAGTF) commanders and their staffs. MTACCS will
achieve interoperability among automated systems by
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utilizing a common family of data processing hardware, a
common operating system and software, and coordinated
functional applications software. [Ref. 9:p. 7]
Presently, the following individual command
and control systems are being integrated:
Tactical Combat Operations System (TCO)
Fire and Maneuver System (FIREMAN)
Flexible Fire Support System (FIREFLEX)
Marine Air-Ground Intelligence System (MAGIS)
Marine Integrated Personnel System (MIPS)
Marine Integrated Logistics System (MILOGS)
Improved Force Automated Services Center (IFASC)
Intelligence Analysis System (IAS)
Advanced Tactical Air Command Central (ATACC)
Tactical Air Operations Module (TAOM)
Marine Air Traffic Control and Landing System (MATCALS)
Position Location Reporting System (PLRS)
All of the systems will implement either
Marine Tactical Systems (MTS) Broadcast Protocol or MTS
Switched Protocol message standards. MTS Interoperability
Test Set (MITS) , consisting of software modules, will be
used to ascertain MTS protocol and message standard
compliance.
The TCO system will provide integration and
data exchange of all of the other component systems. It
will provide the automation required by MAGTF and
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subordinate commanders for the receipt, integration,
display, and dissemination of selective input from command
and control systems. The TCO will be used by commanders in
the Command Element, Ground Combat Element, Aviation Combat
Element, and the Combat Service Support Element at all
echelons of the MAGTF. [Ref. 9:p. 8]
The communications systems employed will
consist of three types: special purpose systems, switched
backbone, and single channel radio. The special purpose
system will support tactical digital information links
(TADIL) , Joint Tactical Information Data System (JTIDS) and
PLRS. The switched backbone will consist of multichannel
radio circuits and digital switches. The switched backbone
will be the primary means of communications. Single channel
radio will be used as the initial means of communications
until the switched backbone network is set up. It will also
serve as a back-up to the switched backbone. [Ref. 9: p. 8]
(2) Amphibious Assault Networking Technology
(AANT)
The purpose of the Amphibious Assault
Networking Technology (AANT) is to demonstrate how MTACCS
can cooperate with advanced methods for communications
networking currently under engineering and manufacturing
development by the Navy, during amphibious assault and
follow-on operations. [Ref. 9: p. 2]
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The Navy Communications Support System (CSS)
has been identified as the architecture for the tactical
communications portion of the Navy's future global command
and control architecture under the COPERNICUS project. The
broad objective of AANT is to develop the capability for
Marine Corps users of MTACCS operating afloat to participate
in the MTACCS network ashore using USN-controlled
communications assets of the amphibious shipping.
The CSS architecture is being designed to
allow any automated subscriber command and control system to
access its networking resources through the use of a
subscriber interface. This interface provides whatever
handshake is needed to the subscriber side of the interface,
meets the unique communications requirements of the
subscriber's protocol (which is MTS under MTACCS), and
provides the necessary handshake to the CSS side of the
interface. In order to permit MTS messages to transit the
CSS architecture, an AANT Converter Interface System (CIS)
must therefore be developed. The AANT CIS design, in
addition to providing the above functionality, will be used
to resolve other compatibility issues such as CSS to MTS
address conversion, fragmentation of MTS messages into
smaller CSS packets, incorporation of transport layer
functionality into the MTS protocol scheme, and other
issues. [Ref. 9:p. 3]
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In 1990, it was determined that a method
would be needed for MTACCS users ashore to operate with
MTACCS users who remain afloat during the various phases of
an amphibious assault. Communications between the two
MTACCS communities would normally use the communications
assets of the host amphibious shipping. If CSS was to
become the tactical communications architecture for Navy
battlegroups, including amphibious units, then a method
would have to be developed to permit the MTACCS communities
to operate in the CSS environment. [Ref. 9: p. 6] The method
determined is to encapsulate MTACCS/MTS packets into the CSS
protocols at the sending station, making the MTS aspect of
the packet transparent to the CSS system. Upon delivery of
the encapsulated MTACCS/MTS packet to the receiving station,
the CSS protocol will be stripped from the packet and the
MTS protocols used to present the textual portion of the
packet. [Ref. 9:p. 6]
The AANT System will consist of the necessary
computer hardware, software, and embedded firmware to
implement a Marine Common Hardware System (MCHS)
communications gateway between the CSS and MTS systems.
This gateway will enable elements of the Marine Corps to use
and interoperate with the Navy's advanced networking
communications system. The AANT System is partitioned into
three major functional areas: the Digital Communications
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Terminal (DCT) Emulator, the Conversion Interface System,
and the Scenario Generator. [Ref. 9:p. 10]
The AANT board shall plug a bus of the MCHS.
The program memory of this board shall be loaded via the AT
bus with the software needed to perform the functions
mentioned above upon reset or power-up of the AN/UYK-85 (A)
.
[Ref. 9:p.l0]
The AANT board and the associated software
shall perform the required data transmission/reception,
message framing/deframing, error detection and correction,
and acknowledge processing. The AANT board shall off-load
task processing from the host processor to the greatest
extent possible to avoid excessive loading of the host
processor. [Ref. 9:p. 10]
The Host Interface Software facilitates
communication between the host application and the AANT
board embedded software at which time the AANT Board shall
be able to communicate in MTS and Packet Crypto standards
simultaneously. [Ref. 9:p. 11]
The AANT software shall be constructed in a
modular fashion, allowing for future modifications and
enhancements. This flexibility is required to support
future versions of MTACCS. The AANT board shall consist of
Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) material whenever possible.
Also, the AANT software shall reuse, whenever possible,
existing and in-development government software. Where
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available, COTS drivers will be used. The drivers will be
used for communications with the host via the AT Bus
interface. [Ref. 9:p. 11]
b. U. S. Air Force
Air Force doctrine dictates that the purpose of a
communications and computer system architecture is to
provide standards, protocols, and interfaces that must be
considered in the development, implementation, or
modification of such systems. Further, these architectures
are developed based on a set of goals, attributes, key
concepts, and common processes. Table 3-1 lists the goals
considered. Table 3-2 shows the objectives of the
architecture development.
Table 3-1. GOALS OF AIR FORCE COMMUNICATIONS-COMPUTER
SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURES. [Ref. 4:p 8]
GOALS
Make sure mission-essential needs for
communications-computer systems are supported.
Exploit information as a resource to enhance mission
effectiveness and efficiency in both wartime and
peacetime.
Make sure mission-essential communications-computer
systems are as functionally survivable and enduring
in stressed environments as the forces supported.
Make sure communications-computer systems that
process sensitive information provided an
appropriate level of information protection.
Exploit technology to improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of communications-computer systems to




The intended environment is a scheme of systems
which will be robustly interconnected to responsively serve
all users. (Figure 3-3)
The architecture of deployable communications-


























Figure 3-3. Communications-Computer Systems Target
Architecture. [Ref. 4:p 11]
environment where systems are designed to be deployed from
their normal in-garrison locations or units. Deployable
systems support a wide range of Air Force functional and
command and control users. They consist of general-purpose
switching facilities, transmission systems, accesses to and
interfaces with common-user systems, and customer premise
equipment. [Ref. 10:p. 11]
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In the Air Force architecture, local information
Table 3-2. OBJECTIVES OF THE AIR FORCE COMMUNICATIONS-
COMPUTER SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURES. [Ref. 4:p 8]
OBJECTIVES
1. Focus the effort of communications-computer systems
organizations to provide better end-user support.
2
.
Enhance communications-computer systems support to
end users to increase mission effectiveness or
permit reduction in resource requirements.
3. Provide end users with powerful, flexible,
integrated tools to improve responsiveness.
4. Enhance user friendliness of communications-computer
systems to reduce training requirements associated
with their use.
5. Provide modern, machine-independent software
engineering tools to expedite development of major
systems
.
6. Increase interoperability through "open systems."
transfer consists of integrated voice, data, video, and
other high capacity transport utilities that support
requirements for intrabase systems connectivity. Long-haul
information transfer systems, on the other hand, provide
interbase and inter-theater communications. This includes
common-user systems managed through the Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA) and dedicated command and control
systems. [Ref. 10: p. 13]
Integrated systems control includes the equipment
and procedures that provide surveillance and restoral of
voice and data network facilities. It provides traffic
information for communications systems operation and
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Figure 3-4. Current Deployable Communications-Computer
Systems Environment. [Ref. 4:p 12]
maintenance, performs automated fault detection and
isolation, and performs network technical control and
resource allocation. It supports base-level information
transfer requirements and the post, camp, and station
termination of the Defense Communications System (DCS) . The
primary goal is to ensure availability of service to
priority users. Integrated systems control includes systems
control, network management of the base infrastructure, and
the interface between the local and long-haul systems.
The intended architecture as shown previously in
Figure 3-3, is an open, multilevel, secure environment of
centralized communications with distributed processing. The
environment is all digital and principally packet-switched
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from base through international levels, and is built of
modular components or structures configured to individual
needs. [Ref. 10:p. 14]
The architecture will be comprised of a robust
digital communications backbone for interbase and intrabase
communications to be established by implementing a local
information transfer system at base level and interface to
long-haul information transfer systems, both monitored and
controlled by integrated control systems. Each base will
establish a digital network composed of several switches
interconnected by high-capacity transmission media such as
fiber optics. Different long-haul services will be
available to allow comparison of services and selection of
the best for the mission being served. This is expected to
reduce cost of the long-haul services and improve both
survivability and responsiveness to changing user needs.
[Ref. 10:p. 14]
The interfaces and sharing of information are
shaped by the approach taken in the development of software,
The specification and implementation of standards in the
software arena will allow a more hardy interconnection of
physical systems and movement toward the open environment.
Government Open Systems Interconnection Profile (GOSIP) and
Portable Operating System Interface for Computer
Environments (POSIX) will be fully developed and employed.
GOSIP will decouple the communications mechanism from the
81
operating systems and applications programs to truly
implement the open system profile. The equipment and
operating system best suited to the user's requirements and
application will be selected. Ada will be the standard
higher-order language. [Ref. 10: p. 14]
The intended architecture will be achieved in an
evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, manner. One
transition concept strategy assumes that existing message
communications should evolve to provide direct writer-to-
reader services, exploiting the growing number of small
computers and terminals in use. The base information
systems management center is a future concept that will
eventually provide automated support systems for a base
central test facility (BCTF) . Figure 3-5 presents the
concept on a typical base. All control actions from base
level up should be consistent with this concept.
The Air Force also has what is referred to as
"tactical architectures" that put systems and those factors
that influence them together into a cohesive whole. There
are nine architectures that comprise the tactical group.
They are:
Deployable Communications-Computer Systems Architecture
Data Management Architecture
Local Information Transfer Architecture
Long-Haul Information Transfer Architecture
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• Automated Support Systems Architecture
• Updating Technical Architecture.
Several of these reflect a desire for compatibility with
ddother services and allied forces and thus will be briefly
discussed.
The deployable systems architecture addresses
systems which are modular and capable of rapid adaptation to
the changing situation and mission while deployed to any
theater worldwide. The key to the architecture is timely
implementation of standards to ensure extension and
replication of the fixed environment. [Ref. 10 :p. 17]
The deployable target architecture is based on
joint interoperability, flexibility, survivability,
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compatibility, supportability, responsiveness, commonality
,
and efficiency. The technical approach to implementing the
target architecture is summarized as "an accelerated use of
commercial standards to mirror developments in the fixed
environment." [Ref. 10 :p. 17] The goal is to eliminate the
requirement for unique interfaces and gateways to the
maximum extent possible. [Ref. 10 :p. 17]
The architecture (Figure 3-6) focuses on a
typical deployed location and concurrently examines the
improvement of support systems within entire theaters at a
given time. The deployed location is divided into three
levels to allow a modular approach to systems employment:
units, nodal, and long-haul. The deployable architecture
includes implementation of narrowband Integrated Services
Digital Network (ISDN) technology offering integrated
digital common-user packet data, voice, and video
capabilities. [Ref. 10:p 18]
The local information transfer architecture is a
base-wide digital network to serve the needs of all base
users and provide an interface with off-base systems. Its
primary feature is the distribution of the switching,
transmission, and connectivity capabilities of the baseline
into a base-wide digital network of multiple nodes connected
through high-capacity transmission systems. Users will
access the network primarily through ISDN interfaces. The











Figure 3-6. Deployable Communications-Computer Systems
Target Architecture. [Ref. 4:p 17]
lines and provide automatic rerouting of traffic around
disrupted communications links and nodes for improved
survivability and reliability. Gateways also provide access
to other information transfer components and to external
systems. [Ref. 10 :p. 19]
The long-haul architecture describes an
integrated-service, long-haul network, characterized by an
enriched, end-to-end digital transmission capability made up
of complementary, robustly interconnected long-haul systems.
An intelligent gateway will provide access to the different
long-haul systems available to a base. Users will be able
to communicate securely through various transmission
technologies governed by international standards and
protocols. Currently, the Defense Information Systems
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Agency • s common-user system architectures state that
AUTOVON, AUTOSEVOCOM, and the Secure Voice System (SVS) will
merge into the Defense Switched Network (DSN) , AUTODIN will
integrate to the Defense Message System (DMS) , and data
networks will migrate to the Defense Data Network (DDN)
.
Compatibility with ISDN is a key element of the target
architecture. [Ref. 10: p. 19]
c. U. S. Army
The Army Tactical Command and Control System
(ATCCS) program is one of the Army's highest priorities and
is intended to enhance the Army's warfighting capabilities.
The program is a comprehensive approach to automating its
tactical command and control systems and improving its
communications capabilities. The effort is designed to
enhance the coordination and control of combat forces
through automated management of five key battlefield
functional areas: (1) field artillery, (2) tactical
intelligence, (3) combat service support, (4) forward area
air defense, and (5) force maneuver control. ATCCS is
comprised of nine segments: five command and control
systems, three communications systems, and one common
hardware and software program to provide computer
commonality. [Ref. ll:p. 1]
The five major command and control systems are
(1) Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS)
,
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(2) All Source Analysis System (ASAS) , (3) Combat Service
Support Control System (CSSCS)
, (4) Forward Area Air Defense
Command, Control, and Intelligence (FAAD C2I) , and (5)
Maneuver Control System (MCS) . These systems will be linked
together by three communication systems: (1) the Army Data
Distribution System (ADDS)
, (2) the Mobile Subscriber
Equipment (MSE) , and (3) the Single Channel Ground and
Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS)
.
[Ref . ll:p. 6] (Figure 3-7)
The Common Hardware and Software (CHS) program
will initially provide the computer for four of the five
major command and control systems. The goal of CHS is to
reverse the proliferation of unique computer systems and
enhance interoperability between the command and control
systems. [Ref. ll:p. 7]
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
(AFATDS) is being developed as the Army's new automated fire
support command and control system. The system is intended
to automate fire support functions from corps down to the
field artillery forward observers. It will also provide
automated support to other fire support assets, including
tactical air, naval gunfire, mortars, attack helicopters,
air defense systems, and tanks. It will replace the
outdated Tactical Fire Direction Systems.
All Source Analysis System (ASAS) is the Army's
portion of the Joint Tactical Fusion Program, a joint Army




















Figure 3-7. ATCCS Architecture and Battlefield Functional
Areas. [Ref. 5:p 6]
analysis of high volume, time-sensitive, intelligence data.
ASAS is intended to automate the fusion of intelligence and
combat information on the types of enemy units, as well as
process information on their locations, movements, and
projected capabilities and intentions. It is designed to
automate data analysis and provide a coherent picture of the
enemy situation and disseminate this information to
commanders so that they can make timely, well-informed
decisions. [Ref. ll:p. 11]
The Army's current strategy for fielding ASAS
equipment includes the development of three systems—
a
limited capability configuration system, a baseline system,
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and the objective system. The Army plans to develop a
limited system that will have the minimum set of features
that the users need and then add features when other
versions are developed. Additional purchases of equipment
that will have the limited capability configuration are
planned to provide enough equipment for two complete sets
and training units. According to the Army's current plans,
the equipment will be used to develop another limited
capability system it calls the baseline system. [Ref. 11: p.
10]
The Army has temporarily exempted ASAS from using
ATCCS CHS components primarily because ASAS software
development had progressed too far to easily switch to CHS.
ASAS will be required, however, to be interoperable with the
other ATCCS components when fielding begins in the mid-
1990s. The Army plans to convert ASAS to CHS computers once
the current computers need replacement. [Ref. 11: p. 11]
Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS)
will automate the collection, analysis, and dissemination of
logistical, medical, financial, and personnel information to
theater, force level, and combat services support
commanders. [Ref. 11 :p. 12] CSSCS will maintain a resource
management information data base for combat service support
commander to use as a basis for decisions on how best to
support the force. CSSCS will also provide the staff
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planners with decision support aids and algorithmic
functions to project support requirements and capabilities.
The Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control,
and Intelligence System (FAAD C2I) is being developed to
automate the command and control of short-range air defense
weapons. It is being designed to detect, identify, process,
and instantly disseminate information on enemy and friendly
aircraft to forward area air defense units. FAAD C2I has
four major components: an automated command and control
computer, a ground-based sensor, an airborne sensor called
the masked target sensor, and an aircraft identification
element. [Ref. 11 :p. 13] Other components of the system
provide automated acquisition, processing, and dissemination
of air tracking data and identification data (to include
positive hostile identification) , to forward area air firing
elements. FAAD C2I interfaces with High to Medium Air
Defense (HIMAD) command and control systems and other
Battlefield Automated (BFA) control systems to exchange data
necessary for overall weapons control status and air defense
warning.
Currently, Maneuver Control System (MCS) is
composed of two types of computers that are not Common
Hardware and Software (CHS) configurations—nondevelopmental
and militarized. MCS is an automated corps-to-battalion
system that will help maneuver commanders and their battle
staff control combat forces. It is being developed to: (1)
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enable the battle staff to collect, store, process, display,
and disseminate critical battlefield information and (2)
produce and communicate battle plans, orders, and enemy and
friendly situation reports. [Ref. 12 :p. 13]
The CHS acquisition strategy is to maximize the
use of off-the-shelf commercial computer hardware and
software products and acquire ruggedized, rather than
militarized, versions of computer hardware for the more
stringent operating conditions encountered during military
operations. [Ref . 12:p. 14] Its goals are to simplify the
Army's logistics, maintenance, support, and training burden
and to lower the cost of acquiring and fielding state-of-
the-art technology for an integrated set of automated
battlefield command and control systems. [Ref. 11 :p. 15]
The CHS contract provided for three types of computers—
a
portable computer unit, a transportable computer unit, and a
hand-held computer unit—and peripheral equipment, such as
printers and disk drives. [Ref. 12 :p. 14]
Army Data Distribution System (ADDS) consists of
the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) and
the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS)
.
EPLRS is an Army-led program to provide low and medium-rate
data communications capabilities for users at division level
and below, such as artillery and forward area air defense
unit. JTIDS, an Air Force-led program, is being developed
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for high-rate data users such as intelligence and long-range
defense units in corps and divisions. [Ref. 11 :p. 17]
Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) is one segment
of the Army Common User System (ACUS) . MSE is being
acquired to provide areawide telephone-like communications
to mobile and stationary users, including voice, data, and
facsimile capability for corps and divisions. Consisting of
radio telephones, switches, generators, trucks, and
automated control centers, MSE is designed to interoperate
with the Tri-Service Joint Tactical Communications System,
combat net radios, commercial telephone systems, and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) communications
networks. MSE is more mobile, less labor intensive, and
more survivable than existing area communications systems.
[Ref. ll:p. 18]
Combat Net Radio (CNR) consists of the Single
Channel Ground/Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) , Improved
High Frequency Radio (IHFR) , and single channel TACSSAT.
SINCGARS will be used by all services and is to provide the
Army with a new generation of lightweight, jam-resistant,
secure, very high frequency combat net radios. It is being
produced in ground and airborne versions and is to be the
primary means of command and control for infantry, armor,
aviation, and artillery units down to the platoon level.
SINCGARS will be capable of transmitting voice and data
communications in an electronically hostile environment by
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using an antijamming technique know as frequency hopping.
[Ref. 11 :p. 20] The other two components of CNR will not be
discussed.
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A. SUMMARY
The basic operational theme of the Copernicus
Architecture is the recognition that Officers in Tactical
Command (OTCs) are inundated with information from many
sources afloat and ashore. Oftentimes, this information
(usually in the form of narrative messages) is either
unneeded or unusable and is sent at the whim of the
originator. The resulting information saturation not only
raises the risk that critical information might be lost or
obscured but also slows down transmission by clogging
communications circuits and message processing computers.
Copernicus is based on the reorientation of C I around
four "pillars" beginning with the Global Information
Exchange System (GLOBIXS) ashore. GLOBIXS "decant"
information from global and theater-wide sensors and
communications systems into a more narrowly focused second
pillar, the Commander-in Chief (CINC) Command Center (CCC)
.
From the CCC, information is further channeled to tactical
networks called the Tactical Data Information Exchange
Systems (TADIXS) . The TADIXSs link the CCCs to the Tactical
Command Centers (TCCs) . The TCCs consist of the integrated
command and control systems installed aboard flagships and
94
aircraft carriers. The TCCs provide the OTC with links to
the Joint Task Forces and Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. The
TCCs further channel mission-specific information as
required to the "shooters" cruisers, destroyers, and
frigates tasked with anti-air warfare (AAW) defense, long
range fighters and attack aircraft assigned to strike
warfare missions, and submarines assigned to antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) . [Ref. 13:p. 58]
Copernicus is based on the introduction of open,
distributed processing architectures that will eliminate the
overhead of specialized message protocols, formats, and
hardware now needed throughout the fleet for unique
communications and processing tasks. The basic
communications and command and control interface is the new
Navy workstation called the Fleet All-Source Tactical
Terminal (FASTT) . FASTT will be based on an open
architecture of easily upgradable commercial hardware and
software. Additionally, programs developing non-
interoperable systems performing single functions, so called
"stovepipes," will be modified to comply with the Copernicus
approach. [Ref. 13 :p. 58] Efforts along these lines can be
seen in the development of various communications systems
that are specifically compatible with the various Copernicus
architectural components.
It is important to note that the other services are also
pursuing other initiatives in creating their own command and
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control architectures. Significantly, however, only the U.S.
Marine Corps' Marine Tactical Automated Command and Control
System/Amphibious Assault Networking Technology
(MTACCS/AANT) is being designed with the Copernicus
Architecture as a major consideration. Other initiatives
include the U.S. Air Force's Communications-Computer Systems
Architecture (AFCCSA) and the U.S. Army's Tactical Command
and Control System (ATCCS) . Although these command and
control architectures are being designed specifically for
the use of the sponsoring service, efforts are being made to
ensure interoperability during joint operations.
B. CONCLUSION
Command and control, especially its communications and
intelligence subsets, has always been, and perhaps always
will be, a concept that will challenge those involved in its
management. Problems abound with the Navy's current command
and control architecture as revealed by events in Grenada
(Operation Urgent Fury) , in Panama (Operation Just Cause)
,
and more recently, in the Kuwait Theater of Operations
(Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm) . Although not limited
to the Navy, poor intelligence (as in Grenada and Panama)
and non-interoperable communications systems (especially in
Grenada and the well known case of the air tasking orders
(ATOs) during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm) do not
bode well for the future of command and control unless major
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changes are implemented not only by the Navy but also by the
other services.
Indeed, major initiatives are being mounted by the
services: the Navy has the Copernicus Architecture, the Army
has the Advanced Tactical Command and Control System
(ATCCS) , the Air Force has the Communications-Computer
Systems Architecture (AFCCSA) , and the Marine Corps has the
Marine Tactical Automated Command and Control
System/Amphibious Assault Networking Technology
(MTACCS/AANT)
.
However, during research and informal conversations by
the authors with the various personnel involved in the
development of command and control architectures, the
authors received the impression that a number of these
personnel were not fully aware of what their counterparts in
the other services were doing. How widespread this is is a
matter of conjecture. However, the concern becomes how
closely the services are working in order to avoid
duplication of effort and to enhance interoperability. This
is especially important in these times of shrinking defense
budgets and rapidly changing priorities. Toward this end,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) created a new division
within the J-6 directorate of the Joint Staff: the J-6I
(Architecture and Standards) Division. The J-6I mandate is
to achieve complete interoperability for all existing and
future C I systems. J-6I will provide direction and develop
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policy to coordinate the efforts of the individual services.
The division's short term goal is to make "quick fixes"
whenever required by the combatant commanders-in-chief
(CINCs) ; mid-term goals include creation of a transitional
C I architecture for joint use; and the long term goal is,
as stated earlier, complete joint interoperability, to
include combined operations.
Concluding, it is encouraging to see the services
finally addressing command and control problems predicted
some time ago. These efforts will go a long way toward the
enhancement of interoperability and ensuring future military
operations will not meet the same problems encountered in
the past. Nevertheless, efforts to minimize parochialism
must be implemented in order to avoid sacrificing jointness.
J-6I was created to foster cooperation so that the services
can work together to develop the systems needed. To develop
these systems on time and on budget will definitely be a
plus and will go a long way towards ensuring United States
superiority in command and control systems and in
maintaining the peace.
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APPENDIX A. COPERNICUS COMPLIANCE WITH THE DOD ACQUISITION
PROCESS
The life cycle of a telecommunications system, such as
Copernicus, is very complex and encompasses numerous
interrelated areas such as software development and
procurement, computer hardware, and the communications
systems. Each of these areas can vary depending upon the
transmission media best suited for the particular
application.
As a major procurement C I system for the Navy, the
acquisition process being pursued for the Copernicus
Architecture complies with DOD Instruction 5000.2 (Defense
Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures) in those
areas defined in the Phase I document and other major
procurement programs of this type. It has taken
approximately two years, from conception, with preliminary
documentation, to the publication of the Phase I:
Requirements Definition in August of 1991. The purpose of
this appendix is to perform a study that compares the Phase
I documentation with the requirements called for in DOD
Instruction 5000.2, and DOD Instruction 5000. 2-M (Defense




The following section provides a reference point in
determining what Phase I requirements are within DOD
directives and standards. This section will also state at
what stage the procurement process has progressed thus far
with the Copernicus program.
1. DOD Directives and Standards
Until recently, the acquisition of software,
computers, and supportive communications equipment was
covered under its own set of instructions. In an attempt to
provide the military with a single reference point on
matters of procurement, these instructions were incorporated
into the omnibus 5000 series of instructions which were
released in February 1991. These instructions embrace the
concept that software development, computer equipment
improvements, and associated communications equipment are
all an integral part of the overall system development.
Part 6 of DOD Instruction 5000.2 provides specific guidance
for the development of a Computer Resources Life-Cycle
Management Plan. Done in conjunction with the Integrated
Logistic Support Plan, it is nothing less than the
acquisition strategy to be used in procuring computer
hardware and software. In it, the project manager is tasked
to "identify and address critical issues, objectives, risks,
costs, methodology, and evaluation criteria" relevant to
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computer resources [Ref. 14:p. 6-D-2]. Additionally, a
Critical Survivability Characteristics Study must be
completed. This requirement states that "survivability will
be achieved through a mix of threat effect tolerance,
hardness, active defense, avoidance, proliferation,
reconstitution, deception, and redundancy" [Ref. 14 :p. 6-F-
2]. Part 6 also tasks the program manager with generating a
test plan for computer components and the overall system as
part of the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) . TEMP
will identify the means by which the survivability
objectives will be validated.
One attachment to part 6 deals specifically with
software and highlights two important points. First, 4-t
emphasizes the need to consider software early in the
procurement cycle, specifically during Phase and Phase 1,
of the life cycle process. Phase objectives are:
• exploring various material alternatives to satisfying
the documented mission need;
• define the most promising system concepts;
• develop supporting analyses and information to include
identifying high risk areas and risk management
approaches to support the Milestone I decision;
• finally propose the acquisition strategy and initial
program objectives for cost, schedule, and performance
for the most promising system concepts. [Ref. 14 :p. 3-8]
(Phase 1 requirements are explored in Section B, Part 1 of
Appendix A.) Secondly, it addresses the need for a
disciplined process in the development of software and
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recommends the use of DOD-STD-2167, Defense System Software
Development.
Technical performance is measured through the use of
the various Military Standards. Of particular interest in
the development of the Copernicus Architecture are MIL-STD-
1799, MIL-STD-2069, and DOD-STD-2169 , which deal with the
survivability of a system, and MIL-STD-188-xxx, which
concentrates on telecommunciations within DOD. Compliance
with MIL-STD-1815, Ada Programming Language, is optional,
but the use of Ada is not. In 1983, DOD required, but has
not enforced, the use of Ada for military software projects.
Since then, support has grown. By 1989, the military
required a specific waiver whenever Ada was not intended to
be used. DOD's insistence on the use of this language goes
beyond establishing a standard. Ada "strongly supports the
use of modern software design practices and programming
techniques which have been shown to enhance software
development and support" [Ref. 2: p. 1-7].
2. Current Copernicus CI System Procurement Awards
Copernicus is an architecture that uses emerging
information systems technology to support Navy warfare
doctrine. More importantly, it focuses upon the people who
execute that doctrine. It states that the information
transfer systems must be transparent to the user and must
support the afloat battle commanders. Copernicus requires a
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full suite of information systems services. It then requires
commanders to utilize logical and dynamic networks to access
those services. Open systems technology is required to
implement Copernicus due to the use of DDN as the backbone
interface between the major components. (OPNAV Instruction
2800.3 provides guidance for deployment of open systems
technology.) Figure A-l provides a graphic demonstration of
the related terminology and interfaces required. [Ref. 6:p.
6]
The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) has
endorsed the Navy's open-system information technology
program. Though still in the early development stages, the
$14.5 billion Copernicus program will be a worldwide
command, control, communications, computers and intelligence
4 ...(C I) program. Significantly, Copernicus has the potential
to be used by all three services. [Ref. l:p. 49] The
Copernicus architecture will spread the funding over eleven
existing areas. At current funding levels, they are: Naval
Communications Ashore, $4 billion; Satellite Communications,
$3.2 billion; Headquarters and Support Activities, $2.3
billion; Strategic Communications, $1.6 billion;
Surveillance, $1.6 billion; Command and Control, $1.4
billion; Non-Satellite Tactical Communications, $947
million; Communications Security, $826 million; Space
Electronic Warfare Transfers, $573 million; Navigation

























Figure A-l. Copernicus Lingo. [Ref. 6:p 4]
million; Wide Area Networks/Worldwide Military Command and
Control System, $274 million [Ref. 15:p. 112].
In conjunction with Senate approval, the Navy has
"awarded UNISYS Corp. $161 million to develop and build a
high-bandwidth data terminal to serve as one of the pillars
of Copernicus" [Ref. 16:p.g 10]. The terminal will
initially be deployed aboard an aircraft carrier and be used
in conjunction with the Battle Group Passive Horizon
Extension System. The extension system will use a dedicated
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radio data link from an airborne platform and the new data
terminals to provide realtime tactical data from positions
hundreds of miles ahead of the fleet. In combination with
this proposal , Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station
(NCTS) Washington has recently demonstrated that the
technology exists to successfully transmit tactical
information from an ashore based facility to the tactical
data center of a ship at sea with the use of the Defense
Data Network (DDN) and that technology upgrade programs can
be described to move beyond these initial capabilities.
B. ANALYSIS OF DOD 5000.2 PHASE I REQUIREMENTS AND
COPERNICUS PHASE I DOCUMENTATION
The purpose of this section is to present the
requirements of the DOD instructions and to evaluate how
well the Copernicus Phase I document complies with them.
1. DOD 5000.2, Phase I - Requirements
Part 3 of DOD Instruction 5000.2 lists numerous
objectives and requirements that must be met by a program in
order to progress to Milestone II, such as determining if
the results of Phase warrants the establishment of a new
acquisition program and along with that establishing a
baseline for the initial cost, schedule, and performance
objectives for the new program. The objectives of Phase I
as stated in DOD Instruction 5000.2 are as follows:
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• Better define the critical design characteristics and
expected capabilities of the system concept (s),
• Demonstrate that the technologies critical to the most
promising concept (s) can be incorporated into system
design (s) with confidence,
• Prove that the processes critical to the most promising
system concept (s) are understood and attainable,
• Develop the analysis/ information needed to support a
Milestone II decision, and
• Establish a proposed Development Baseline containing
refined program cost, schedule, and performance
objectives for the most promising design approach.
Each of these objectives will be examined in
relation to how adequately the Phase I document for the
Copernicus Architecture fulfills them. The analysis will
include a portion of the minimum requirements that must be
accomplished as directed in DOD Instruction 5000.2 as the
Copernicus Architecture Phase I documentation currently in
publication does not yet cover all requirements. Those that
will be evaluated are as follows:
• A validated system threat assessment,
• Identification of major cost, schedule, and performance
trade-off opportunities,
• A Development Baseline which includes proposed cost,
schedule, and performance objectives,
• Developmental test results that indicate the degree to
which new or emerging technologies pose a risk to the
program,
• An updated assessment that shows that projected life-
cycle costs and annual funding requirements are
affordable in the context of long-range investment plans
or similar plans
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• Programming of adequate resources to support the
proposed program
• Proposed program-specific exit criteria that must be
accomplished during Phase II, Engineering and
Manufacturing Development.
2. Copernicus Phase I - Requirements
The Copernicus Architecture, Phase I Requirements
Definition, thoroughly explores the anticipated capabilities
of the system. A brief summary at the beginning of Chapter
3 of Phase I gives a concise description of the overall
system, its component parts, and its goal of providing the
"tactical commander with six doctrinal choices that allow
him to construct his new C I system to support the mission,
and his decision to delegate forces to carry out that
mission." [Ref. 2:p. 3-1]
Chapter 3 goes on to conclusively define the fact
that Copernicus is designed to focus on the operator at four
levels,
• the watchstander
• the Navy tactical commander
• the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander, and
• the shore commander.
Other areas covered are the anticipated information flow
through the system and the command and control doctrine to
be used by the architecture. The latter area extensively
covers the six doctrinal choices provided to the tactical
107
commander in conducting his operations and the
accomplishment of his mission.
The definitions provided by Phase I, and discussed
briefly above, lead to the conclusion that the requirements
from DOD Instruction 5000.2 (listed in the proceeding
section) are met in Chapter 3 and the following four
chapters which clearly define the components of the
architecture. The remaining objectives are covered in the
subsequent chapters. Chapter 8 "presents a view of the
architecture in terms of how it should be designed and
implemented." [Ref. 2: p. 8-1] Covered in this area are the
current information management techniques and information
technology available for use ashore and afloat. This
includes the networks and communication services and
workstations. The chapter also looks at current and future
systems that it will have to integrate with such as the Base
Information Transfer System (BITS)
,
the Defense Message
System (DMS) , and the primary DOD telecommunications
network: the Defense Switched Network (DSN)
.
Each of the components or "building blocks" of the
Copernicus Architecture is completely explored as to the
technology basis required for it to accomplish its
operation. The document examines the "evolutionary open
systems architecture model of the Navy Command and Control
Systems (NCCS) ... in achieving optimum commonality and
interoperability among computer systems." [Ref. 2:p. 8-9]
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"The CINC Command Complex (CCC) also builds on the evolving
technologies of multimedia networking and distributed
systems that facilitate graceful growth and modernization at
less cost than earlier stand alone systems. Equally
important, these technologies provide an engineering means
to achieve desired levels of computer system and
communication system interoperability within and between
Navy centers and between Navy centers and national, joint,
and allied centers." [Ref. 2: p. 8-9,10]
Programmatic requirements and the methodologies by
which the Navy plans to move from the Cold War environment
and systems to the post-Cold War Copernicus Architecture are
discussed in Chapter 9. The pertinent areas addressed
include: Copernicus and the Space and Electronic Warfare
(SEW) Baseline System; SEW Technology; Copernicus as a
Subsystem of SEW; Stovepipes to Building Blocks; POM 94
Investment Strategy; Manpower, Personnel and Training (MPT)
Strategy; and R&D Implications. The areas of particular
interest to this project will be reviewed for compliance
with DOD Instruction 5000.2 requirements, some in more
detail than others.
In 1989, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
established Space and Electronic Warfare (SEW) as a warfare
mission area (WMA) . This represented the Navy's effort and
dedication to bring together the elements of electronic
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warfare, C4 I, surveillance and other strategic and tactical
fields into one system.
Regarding the SEW Baseline, four considerations must
be examined:
• what is SEW doctrinally,
• who is SEW,
• what is SEW technologically, and
• what is SEW programmatically.
... 2Responsibility for Navy command and control (C ) has
been delegated to the Space and Electronic Warfare (SEW)
directorate established in 1989. "Naval Command and Control
is the warfare function through which a maritime commander
delegates warfighting responsibilities to subordinate
commanders and their units under his command. Command and
control is exercised through a supporting technological,
doctrinal, and organizational system known today as command
and control, communication and computers, and intelligence
(C4I)." [Ref. 2:p. 1-1]
"SEW is the destruction or neutralization of enemy
targets and the enhancement of friendly force battle
management through the integrated employment and
exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum and medium of
space." [Ref. 2: p. 1-2] SEW encompasses measures that are
employed to:
• Coordinate, correlate, fuse, and employ aggregate
communications, surveillance, reconnaissance, data
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correlation, classification, targeting and
electromagnetic attack capabilities;
• Deny, deceive, disrupt, or exploit the enemy's
capability to communicate, surveil, reconnoiter,
classify, target, and attack; and
• Direct and control employment of friendly forces. [Ref.
2:p. 1-2]
Programmatically, the Copernicus Architecture
strives to have common standards, better and cheaper
logistics through Planned Incremental Modernization (PIM)
,
and evolutionary procurement. This architecture allows for
the definition of system components functionally from end-
to-end and for a methodology that involves five steps:
1. Identify Functional Copernicus Building Blocks
(hardware & software)
2. Evolve Existing Programs to Similar Building Blocks
3. Overlay Existing Against Required Copernicus Blocks
(Shortfalls = RDT&E)
4. Develop System and Component Integrated Logistics
Support Strategy (ILS)
5. Restructure Programs - occurs over the Six-Year Defense
Plan (SYDP)
OP-94 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) Investment
Strategy for 94 "is currently in development and will
involve the fusion of a series of decision points from the
SEW Baseline Study, the Copernicus Project Team, and OP-94 0.
The Investment Strategy is aimed at defining and
implementing future program direction and support for
Copernicus component systems . . . The investment strategy
also identifies R&D efforts that are needed to support SEW
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and Copernicus implementation." [Ref. 2:p. 9-10] This is a
bottom-up approach oriented toward assessing programs
individually vis-a-vis a defined set of decision
points". [Ref . 2:p. 9-10]
The goal of the SEW investment strategy methodology
is to rank candidate systems. There are three prioritized
ranking groups: high priority systems, systems requiring
restructuring, and systems requiring further investigation.
The candidate systems or programs are assigned to the
appropriate investment category or categories. Each system
is then scored in accordance with the degree to which it
conforms to the Copernicus, SEW, and Programmatic decision
points, shown in Figure A-2 . [Ref. 2:p. 9-11]
"The Copernicus decision points (Figure A-3) and the
SEW investment strategy extend these to a total of 28
decision points (Figures A-4 and A-5) . Thus, the process of
fusing the results from the two methodologies has a firm
foundation. This fusion task will be completed as part of
the POM 94 development". [Ref. 2: p. 9-12]
The next area pursued is Manpower, Personnel, and
Training (MPT) Strategy. This is very significant as
manpower and properly trained personnel are essential for
operating and implementing the Copernicus Architecture.
"The combined issue of manpower and training is now a key
decision point in assessing all SEW systems. The basic
assumption for MPT planning in support of the SEW is that
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Systems
Figure A-2 . Program Review Methodology. [Ref. 2:p. 9-11]
implementation of the SEW and Copernicus concepts will occur
with no net growth of manpower or training resources." [Ref.
2:p. 9-13] "Four major manpower and training thrusts
underlie the MPT strategy:
• The quantity of manpower available;
• The anticipated quality of those individuals;
• Training requirements; and
• Human/system integration." [Ref. 2: p. 9-14]
Numerous aspects of manpower and training are addressed in
the ensuing pages. These include issues regarding the type
of personnel that should be sought to support Copernicus to
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the various types of
training available,
including the efforts of
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the goals and visions toward Figure A-3. Copernicus Decision
Points. [Ref. 2:p. 9-12]
which (the Navy) is
striving, discussing the processes needed to develop and
execute the path to those goals, and providing specifics
that will direct and guide the processes. The specifics
will be grouped in the categories of technologies,
management, and implementation." [Ref. 2: p. 9-16]
Each of the chapters already described conclusively
define the requirements as stated in the objectives of DOD
Instruction 5000.2. There is a thorough discussion with
regard to the technologies currently available and to the
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Figure A-4. SEW Decision
Points. [Ref. 2:p. 9-12]
^
integration of those in the
planning stages with which the
system must interface. In a
recent Federal Computer Week
White Paper, Vice Adm. Jerry
O. Tuttle, was quoted as
saying, "Copernicus would move
all Navy C I from incompatible
stovepipe systems to a
homogeneous architecture with
suites of quickly upgradable hardware." [Ref. 17: p. 14]
However, even though a baseline has been established, it
does not seem to have been completed to the extent required
in DOD Instruction 5000.2. There is a specified methodology
for evaluating a program or system on a generic basis, as
shown in Figures 4, 5, and 6. The criteria by which the
programs or systems will be evaluated prior to reaching this
point are not clearly defined. Also, there has not been any
refinement of program cost. In fact, there are no real cost
figures given in the document at all. Additional research
has revealed that the Copernicus program has received
funding in the area of $14.5 billion for FY 92/93 from the
Senate Armed Services Committee in the Defense authorization
bill [Ref. l:p. 49]. Another area not in compliance with
the requirements of DOD Instruction 5000.2 is that of a
program schedule. There is no clearly defined schedule
115
stating when specific items
of the program will be
operational other than to
state when the various teams
associated with the project
development will meet. The
minimum required
accomplishments to complete
this phase have been covered
in the preceding discussion.
There was a valid threat
assessment done before the
mission need statement was
completed, and the need for















Decision Points. [Ref. 2:p. 9-
12]
stated in the beginning of this paper. Major cost,
schedule, and performance trade-off opportunities have been
identified under Phase I documentation and covered
thoroughly above. Copernicus Architecture Phase I
Requirements Definition also requires proposed program-
specific exit criteria that must be accomplished during
Phase II, Engineering and Manufacturing Development.
"Phase II will consist of three main thrusts:
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• The designation, by the staff of OP-094, of a Space and
Electronic Warfare (SEW) Architect. The SEW Architect
will have broad architectural, managerial, and
operational authority over the development of the SEW
systems, including the Copernicus Architecture.
• The designation, by the staff of the Space and Naval
Warfare Systems Command (COMSPAWARSYSCOM) , of a SEW
Engineer. The SEW Engineer will have broad authority
over systems integration and engineering oversight of
the SEW system, including the Copernicus Architecture.
• The designation, by the staff of OP-094, of a SEW
Programmer. The SEW Programmer will have responsibility
for programmatic integration of SEW systems, including
the Copernicus Architecture." [Ref. 2:p. 10-1]
The document goes on to expound on three major areas
the architecture will focus its efforts on, namely, the
establishment of working groups from all operational levels
and industry to expand the concepts of operational
requirements and to expand their current level of detail
throughout the Navy; and eventually, the refinement of the
existing model into one designed for joint applications.
"Additionally, the Architecture will ensure
alignment of the architecture with Department of Defense
plans for implementing Corporate Information Management
(CIM) by blending management information systems ashore with
tactical CI systems afloat." [Ref. 2:p. 10-3] The final
area concentrated upon is the one in which engineers need to
focus their efforts. Based on the sequence of events
graphically displayed in Appendix C of the Phase I document,
the anticipated completion time frame for Phase II is
January 1993.
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Thus, the required analysis and information needed
to support a Milestone II decision are specifically outlined
in the document. The requirement for the program manager to
work with the user or his/her representative, has also been
accomplished with the establishment of the working groups
during Phase II.
C. DOD 5000.2, REQUIREMENTS PERTINENT TO C*I SYSTEMS
It is critical in the development and evaluation of a
system to ensure compliance with DOD regulations. The
following is a list of those regulations pertinent to a C I
system, with a discussion of the Copernicus documentation.
1. Critical System Characteristics
As a Command, Control, Communications, Computers and
Intelligences program, the critical system characteristics
need to be evaluated as outlined in Part 4, Section C of DOD
Instruction 5000.2. "System characteristics dictated by
operational capability needs and constraints and critical to
the successful operation and support of a new or modified
major system shall be identified early and specifically
addressed in cost-schedule-performance trade-offs." [Ref.
14 :p. 4-C-l] Under this basic definition, there are several
distinctive policy points stated that must be reviewed for
applicability. Of these points, the ones most pertinent to
Copernicus are two which state: "...include survivability;
transportability; electronic counter-countermeasures; energy
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efficiency; and interoperability, standardization, and
compatibility with other forces and systems including
support infrastructure". [Ref. 14 :p. 4-C-l] Part 4 goes on
to list the following under procedure: operational
constraints (encompassing the threat environment) , natural
environment issues and their effects on logistics, operation
and maintenance. It also provides criteria for identifying
critical system characteristics. Each of these
characteristics are those listed above as pertinent to
Copernicus, and they are described in detail.
How does the current phase of the Copernicus Life
Cycle Management comply with these specifications? The
current phase document takes into consideration the threat
environment, both in the initial mission need statement and
in the latter portions during the assessment of individual
component requirements. Logistics and the effects the
natural environment will have are evaluated with regards to
survivability and redundancy of the system. Considering
operational constraints, Copernicus seems to be a system
designed to relieve the constraints presently placed on the
user by enabling the user/operator to access only data
critical to the operation. Other constraints specific to
the Copernicus Architecture will not be known until the
entire system is operational. Nevertheless, by current
development plans, it appears these are being addressed as
much as possible as they become known.
119
2. Evolutionary Acquisition
"Evolutionary acquisition is an approach in which a
core capability is fielded, and the system design has a
modular structure and provisions for future upgrades and
changes as requirements are refined. An evolutionary
acquisition strategy is well suited to high technology and
software intensive programs where requirements beyond a core
capability can generally, but not specifically, be defined."
[Ref. 14 :p. 5-A-5]
The Copernicus Architecture, as defined in the Phase
I, Requirements Definitions document, has been developed
with this type of acquisition strategy anticipated. First,
it is a technologically complex system with extensive
software development requirements. Secondly, by virtue of
the need to remain on the cutting edge of technology and for
its design to use applications not yet developed, the
strategy must remain open, not only to evolving technologies
but also to evolutionary architecture such as the new open
system "human-machine interface . . . based on commercial
products already being used by the Navy Tactical Command and
Communication Support System." [Ref. 17: p. 14]
3. Survivability
The term survivability encompasses a large area.
This ranges from the survivability of a system against a
hostile environment to the ability to change with
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operational needs and threat assessment. Procedures in DOD
Instruction 5000.2 outline six major areas that should be







Of these six, two of the areas have already been addressed
while two of the areas fall into later phases of the program
development. The remaining two, Life-Cycle Survivability
and Logistics Support, need to be briefly reviewed for
compliance.
Life-Cycle Survivability states that, "using,
maintaining, and testing agencies will reassess system
survivability characteristics." [Ref. 14 :p. 6-F-3] As
stated in the Copernicus Phase I document, there is a
requirement to review all existing OP-094 C I related
programs to determine if they are still effective in today's
environment. Those found viable must then be evaluated as
to whether or not it might be a potential addition to the
Copernicus Architecture. Future reviews once the system has
been fully developed and is operational are not listed in
the current documentation, but should be defined in Phase IV
of the Life-Cycle Management of the project.
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"The Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP) for
systems with critical survivability characteristics will
define a program to ensure those characteristics are not
compromised during the system life cycle through loss of
configuration control: use of improper spare or repair
parts; performance of inappropriate maintenance or repair;
or hardness degradation due to normal operations,
maintenance, and environments." [Ref. 14: p. 6-F-4]
As stated in the programmatic requirements above,
step four of the methodology used is to develop an
integrated logistics support strategy for each of the major
components. The Copernicus document identifies the fact
that this is a two-fold process, that there is a need for
both a system ILS and a component ILS, and that the life
cycle support varies both by component and by system.
Therefore, this portion of the survivability requirement is
also being evaluated at an early stage in the development
and should be carried through to later phases as dictated by
DOD Instruction 5000.2.
4. Infrastructure/C I Systems Committee
According to DOD Instruction 5000.2, "each new
system, or major change to an existing system, shall be
assessed for its interaction with and integration into the
command, control, communications, (computer) and
intelligence structure." [Ref. 14 :p. 7-C-l] Even though
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this is a command, control, communications, computer and
intelligence system, it must still comply with this portion
of the regulation, as it sets the standards that other
systems must interface with. The procedures for this
requirement are outlined, beginning with the MIL-STD-188
Series, which "address the telecommunications design
parameters and influence the functional integrity of
telecommunications systems and ability to interoperate
efficiently with other functionally similar government and
commercial systems." [Ref. 14 :p. 7-C-2] This requirement
for interoperability and compatibility has already been
clarified in a preceding section, with the discussion of the
need for integration with Base Information Transfer System
(BITS) , Defense Message System (DMS) , and the Defense
Switched Network (DSN) . A further reference to
interoperability comes from the mention of a joint model.
This also keeps the program in compliance with any
requirements placed by the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council during its review. Though this requirement was
reviewed at Milestone per DOD Instruction 5000.2, "the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council will validate
performance objectives and thresholds proposed for the
acquisition program baseline of acquisition category I
programs coming to the Defense Acquisition Board beginning
at Milestone I." [Ref. 14 :p. 13-D-2]
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D. SUMMARY/CONCLUSION
The Copernicus Architecture and funding plan have been
"closely pegged (as) the best assessments available of
global and regional threats that may emerge during this
decade." [Ref. 16 :p. Ill] The requirements document
addresses the technological and communications structure of
the architecture, including the revolutionary investment
strategy classified as Planned Incremental Modernization
(PIM) . PIM centers on technology refreshment techniques and
is designed to carry the Space and Electronic Warfare
Directorate into Fiscal Years 1992 - 2000.
"The investment strategy must achieve three
technological goals. The first is to identify systems that
are obsolete both in operational value and in technological
approach and to jettison them from the budget. Second,
those systems that remain operationally viable but
technologically obsolete must be infused with new
technology, and a programmatic methodology must be developed
to do so . . . The Navy must accelerate genuine building-
block programs to achieve a technological building base in
the fleet and to devise a logistics and acquisition strategy
to keep it there." [Ref. 16: p. 114]
"To accelerate these programs, . . . the Copernicus





I systems that have a high percentage of pre-1985
electronics technology are probably obsolete de facto
and are leading candidates for cancellation based on
operational, programmatic and technological validation.
• C
4
I programs that infuse standardized building blocks
into the fleet should be accelerated.
• C4I programs that require large Navy integrated
logistics and maintenance support are leading candidates
for restructuring.
• C*I systems that do not use a high percentage of
commercial off-the-shelf software are strong candidates
for cancellation as non-supportable. New Navy-unique
software, however, will be written in Ada." [Ref. 5:p.
114, 115]
As the preceding discussion explained, the Phase I
documentation for the Copernicus Architecture has been done
in compliance with DOD Instruction 5000.2. The points
listed above demonstrate that the document is in tune with
the future cuts in the budget and are key issues when
looking at "reducing uncertainty and staying on the
offensive in the development of an effective operational
strategy." [Ref. 16 :p. 115] Other instances of compliances
with both DOD Instruction 5000.2 and DOD Instruction 5000. 2M
is evident in the documentation including reports required
for manpower estimation, threat assessment, and a test and
evaluation master plan.
Through the development of the Copernicus Architecture,
the Navy has developed three decision points with regard to
resources and their allocation:
• "C I systems that exceed a set percentage of funding by
appropriation within the space and electronic warfare
directorate should enter an intense and formal
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management framework in which great risk is applied to
the contractor and to the program sponsor for failure to
meet schedules and cost.
• Directorate claims that exceed set percentages of
research, development, testing and engineering and
organization and maintenance funding established across
the directorate should be reduced over the funding cycle
at a predictable rate to achieve the overall target
reduction.
4 ...
•CI systems that are resource-intensive in terms of
manpower and overhead operations and maintenance must be
eliminated over the six-year span." [Ref. 16: p. 115]
Again the requirements conform to those specified in the
DOD directives. Thus, through the study of the Copernicus
Architecture Phase I Requirements Definition, it is apparent
that care was taken to ensure that the document meets all
the basic requirements imposed by DOD Instruction 5000.2 and
DOD Instruction 5000. 2M. It also appears that consideration
was taken with regards to the updating requirements for
Milestone review, as each of the sections can easily be
updated to meet this requirement. Furthermore there are no
exacting requirements specified that would be hard to adapt
to changing technology, thus the requirements have been kept
flexible enough to meet these changes as the technology
develops.
As an overall document, therefore, the Copernicus
Architecture Phase I Requirements Definition meets the
minimum requirements and is therefore a viable document
under the requirements of DOD Instruction 5000.2 and DOD
Instruction 5000. 2M.
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APPENDIX B. THE NAVY COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT SYSTEM (CSS)
The Tactical Data Information Exchange System (TADIXS)
component of the Copernicus Architecture is manifested by
the communications system managed by the Navy's
Communications Support System (CSS)
.
[Ref . 2:p. 6-3] The
purpose of CSS is to demonstrate the feasibility of using
Local Area Network (LAN) technology to establish a Navy
communication system with the following characteristics:
• Dynamic load sharing among links;
• Dynamic routing around electronically jammed links or
nodes, thus eliminating single point failures; and
• Easy addition of new subsystem links via the use of an
open system architecture. [Ref. 9: p. 8]
CSS offers users access to multiple communication links
such as High Frequency (HF) radio links, Ultra-high
Frequency (UHF) radio links, UHF Satellite Communications
(SATCOM) links, and Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM
links. These links are shared by multiple CSS platforms on
ships, aircraft, or shore installations. CSS is organized so
that data exchanged over a single link is not limited to one
particular use, such as Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS) or
digitized voice traffic. Each link is assigned traffic in
accordance with the specifications of the CSS Network Plan
(NETPLAN) . [Ref. 9:p.8]
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In addition to users sharing different links with each
other, users also share the same communications channel
bandwidth on some links. Each multiple user access channel
has a mechanism for sharing the channel bandwidth on a
single link among several CSS platforms. In order to use
such a multiple access link, data from each CSS platform is
formatted into a data packet. The data packet is then
transmitted when the multiple access protocol for that link
allow transmission. In order to control access to a multiple
access link, each CSS platform must arbitrate with other CSS
platforms for channel access based on a set of rules, such
as priority or precedence level, position in the queue, or
data traffic requirements, to name a few.
CSS uses an open system architecture to allow for an
upgrade path as technology advances. This is based on
functional partitioning of the system into separate units
that communicate over a high speed Ethernet LAN. When a new
device is added to the CSS system, it must first conform to
the CSS control and data message formats.
CSS is partitioned into the following components:
• Communications Controller (CC) : The physical computer (s)
in which the CSS functions are implemented.
• Operating System/Inter Process Communication (OS/IPC)
:
The software that provides the operating system
functions and communications between segments.
• Subscriber Interface Control (SIC) : A software interface
between the subscribers and the CSS.
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• Resource Access Control (RAC) : The interface between the
SICs and the communications assets, i.e., radios,
modems , cryptos
.
• Link Access Control (LAC) : Augments radio functions,
error detection and correction, modem functions, etc.
• System/Site Control (SSC) : Responsible for maintenance
and dissemination of system wide communications
information.
• Operator Interface Control (OIC) : Supports functions
such as communication status monitoring, CSS control,
and communication planning.
• Keying Device (KD) : Provides on-line data encryption, if
required. Referred to as "Security (SC)" in Figure B-l.
• Crypto Packet (CP) : Ensures LAN security in the CSS.
[Ref. 4:p. A-119, Ref. 9:p. 9]
End users at different CSS platforms exchange data over
the CSS communications network using the SIC as their entry
point. The SIC transfers its data over the CSS network by
accessing a RAC.
A key aspect of CSS is the management of communications
resources. These resources are managed and allocated by the
RAC as a service to the SIC. CSS controls its communications
resources through the use of accesses, which are controlled
by the SSC. When a SIC requests an access assignment from
the SSC, the SSC assigns a RAC to be used for the access.
If another SIC with higher priority requests an access, the
SSC may disrupt a lower priority access by revoking its
access. The lower priority SIC must then start over and
request a new access. If a link fails or is jammed, the SSC
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will revoke access of all SICs using that particular link.
These SICs must then request new accesses. [Ref. 9: p. 9]
If data encryption is required on a particular link, the
data are routed from a RAC to a cryptographic Keying Device
(KD) before being routed to the radio frequency (RF)
communications equipment.
Each LAC is paired with a corresponding RAC. For
transmission, the SIC passes the subscriber data across an
Ethernet LAN to the RAC. The RAC determines when to transmit
the data by arbitrating with other RACs for channel access.
The RAC sends the data to the LAC through the KD encryption
unit and then through to the RF communications equipment.
The LAC also controls the actual transmission timing. The
reverse process occurs for received data. (See Fig. B-l)
.
LAN security is maintained by the Packet Crypto
function. To ensure that low security level users do not
have access to high security level data, the Packet Crypto
encrypts the subscriber data before it enters the SIC.
However, address information is diverted around the
encryption process so that the LAN can route the data to the
correct destination. [Ref. 9:p. 9]
Users provide data in the following Copernican
operational formats: voice, OPNOTE, narrative message,
facsimile, Copernicus Common Format (COPCOM) , data base
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Figure B-l. CSS Functional Partitioning. [Ref. 4:p. A-118]
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Future enhancements to CSS include distribution of the
CONN Plan and the COMM Plan information over the LAN. The
CONN Plan is used to distribute frequency usage and routing
information automatically to the various devices on the LAN.
The COMM Plan distributes CSS Address information to devices
on the LAN in a similar manner. Both the CONN and COMM Plans
supply their data to the SSC. CONN and COMM Plan information
are used to update the system automatically at regular
intervals. [Ref. 9:p. 10]
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